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ABSTRACT 
The United States military must fundamentally evolve its strategy and capabilities 
to better meet the unconventional challenges that define the post 9/11 era. Two principal 
requirements of this evolution are: (1) adopting a population centric strategy for 
counterinsurgency and nation building, and (2) developing capabilities that better 
integrate U.S. forces and Host Nation civilians, leadership, and security forces. This 
thesis shows how a new Army initiative called the Human Terrain System (HTS) 
advances the U.S. Army toward achieving these requirements by embedding Human 
Terrain Teams (HTTs) within U.S. Army units performing counterinsurgency and nation 
building in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The research uses the case study method to analyze a currently deployed Human 
Terrain Team. The analysis leverages Knowledge Flow Theory to explain how the HTT 
creates, shares, and harnesses relevant cultural knowledge to improve the competitive 
performance of the host unit and advance the adoption of a population centric strategy. 
The thesis concludes that the embedded HTT concept is valid and necessary in 
counterinsurgency and nation building contexts. The thesis recommends developing a 
sufficient pool of career military social scientists to serve as future candidate participants, 
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This chapter introduces important contextual information necessary for framing 
the research. It first describes the nature of the counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation 
building environment and how its unique characteristics affect strategic choices faced by 
the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Chapter I also introduces the 
Human Terrain System (HTS) as one of the choices selected by the U.S. Army to help 
improve COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Following the introduction of the 
HTS organization, the chapter finishes by establishing the need for the research, and 
defining the research domain, and benefits.  
A. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) ENVIRONMENT 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked the preeminent emergence of 
a new period in conflict that fundamentally challenges conventional war and the 
conventional way of thinking about war. This challenge may also represent the historical 
turning point where the world acknowledged the dawn of an era of extended conflict with 
viable non-state organizers of war such as al-Qaida (Bunker, 2005; Van Creveld, 1991, p. 
225). Conceiving of two fundamentally different kinds of war, that which is waged 
between or among states and that which is not, the latter kind represents a difficult 
challenge for the state possessing a conventional military poised to fight an 
unconventional opponent (e.g., a state vs. an insurgent group) (Taber, 2002, p. 19; Van 
Creveld, 1991, p. 226). The difficulties experienced by the United States fighting 
insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that a conventional force 
optimally configured to fight a conventional enemy performs sub-optimally against an 
unconventional insurgent group (U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, 2007, p. li).  
While al-Qaida and the events of 9/11 served as the catalyst for America’s global 
response against Islamist insurgent groups and state sponsors of terror, the broader issue 
at hand is that modern nation states face an increasing and enduring threat from insurgent 
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groups (Bunker, 2005, p. xxi; U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, 2007, p. xlii; Van Creveld, 1991, p. 192; Metz & Millen, 2003). Insurgencies are 
occurring across the globe in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and Southeast Asia. 
These or other irregular threats are not new, but the capabilities of these groups have 
improved in recent decades and now pose a more credible threat to nation states and the 
stability of the international system (Bunker, 2005, p. xxi; Van Creveld, 1991, p. 192). 
Thus, a dramatic shift in the way in which modern states conceive of and wage war 
against insurgent groups is necessary (Van Creveld, 1991, p. ix). However, dramatic and 
sweeping changes are often difficult to come by in large complex organizations like the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) (Nutt & Backoff, 1992). As a result, smaller 
and more incremental changes have begun to adapt the U.S. military to fight 
counterinsurgency more effectively. This thesis focuses on one notable U.S. Army COIN 
initiative called the Human Terrain System (HTS).  
Researching the Human Terrain System as an instrument for change is important 
at this point in time because success in COIN and nation building is often difficult to 
achieve, and many schools of thought exist on how to operate in this complex 
environment. The HTS is a unique initiative because it attempts to leverage special social 
science capabilities not organic to the U.S. military to obtain a fundamental 
understanding and respect for the complexities of local human populations. These 
populations with all of their intricacies, behaviors, motivations, perceptions, preferences, 
and cultural contexts define a cognitively dynamic and daunting operating environment 
(U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. 91; Taber, 
2002, p. 23-24).  
Achieving success in the complex and dynamic COIN environment requires an 
astute sense of and respect for the human aspects of the operational environment. In 
America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT), a war being waged globally in large part to 
fight myriad Islamist insurgencies, grasping the fundamental nature of each conflict 
requires grappling with at least four primary concepts necessary for organizing strategy. 
Introducing these concepts here is important because they will be referenced throughout 
the research.  
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1. Theories of Victory: Conventional vs. Unconventional War 
Perhaps of foremost concern to military planners is to what extent strategy ties to 
operations and tactics. Choosing an appropriate strategy in COIN first requires adopting a 
fundamental theory of victory that is appropriate for the environment and circumstances. 
McCormick states that in the COIN environment, the appropriate choice for strategy 
often stems from an opposite theory of victory (unconventional theory) than conventional 
reflex and wisdom might otherwise yield (Schaner, 2008a). Nagl and many other scholars 
support this notion by referring to the “indirect” approach (population-centric approach) 
as an often necessary strategy for victory in COIN (Nagl, 2005 p. 28; U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. xxv; Galula, 2006, p. 50).  
To illustrate just how different an unconventional COIN strategy is, consider how 
counterinsurgency guru David Galula defines victory in COIN warfare. He points out that 
victory requires not only the destruction of the insurgent’s political organization and 
forces, but also “the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population.” Galula 
continues by qualifying this isolation as one that is “not enforced upon the population but 
maintained by and with the population.” The latter part of this definition alludes to why 
applying an unconventional strategy in COIN can be particularly challenging for 
conventional militaries – it demands compelling the population’s active support (an 
unusual task for traditional warfare). McCormick asserts that a warfare strategy focused 
on the population is fundamentally the opposite of one that is focused on enemy forces. 
This draws the contrast between two opposing theories of victory – conventional vs. 
unconventional. McCormick takes this concept a step further by casting a particular 
sequence associated with each theory. This sequence is illustrated next as the opposing 
theories are contrasted in greater detail. 
A conventional theory of victory relates to conventional warfare and the methods 
associated with waging “traditional” combat between two or more states and their 
military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, p. 10; U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual 2007, p. xxvvii; Galula, 2006, p. 50). McCormick 
asserts a logical sequence necessary for winning conventional wars. He states that 
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success in conventional war is usually obtained by first defeating the opponent’s military. 
Moreover, achieving success on the battlefield in this manner serves as a necessary 
precondition to obtaining the enemy government’s surrender and finally the people’s 
acquiescence. In short, the sequence to victory in conventional war is well understood to 
be: army → government → people (Schaner, 2008a).World War II provides a superb 
example of conventional war. 
Conversely, McCormick asserts an unconventional theory of victory relates to 
unconventional warfare and the methods associated with waging “non-traditional” war 
such as that between a state and a non-state group (e.g., between a regime and an 
insurgent group). McCormick states this kind of war is fundamentally the opposite of 
conventional war, and is not simply a “small scale” war that exists within a ubiquitous 
“range of military operations” or “spectrum of conflict.” McCormick asserts this kind 
war follows a necessary and opposite sequence to victory: people → government → 
army (Schaner, 2008a). 
This sequence is problematic for conventionally oriented forces like the U.S. 
armed forces. The problem is revealed by the unconventional theory’s non-traditional 
objectives. For instance, in the sequence the population becomes the primary objective of 
the counterinsurgent. Since the population is not a specific geographic location or enemy 
formation, “winning the objective” requires different skill sets and concepts. 
Furthermore, the “government” of this sequence refers to the insurgent organization and 
administrative structure. It is illusive and hidden – unlike traditional state governments. 
Last, the “army” of this sequence is the collection of insurgent fighters who meld into the 
population “by day”, and strike “by night”. Thus, they remain largely invisible to 
traditional means of electronic or human target identification (Schaner, 2008a). 
The implication of these diametrically opposed kinds of war runs deep. For 
instance, America’s military transformation, organization, and operations are currently 
guided by a conventional theory of victory and war fighting doctrine – the doctrine of 




Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress: “Network Centric Warfare is no less 
than the embodiment of an Information Age transformation of DoD” (Alberts & Hayes, 
2003, p. 3).  
The driving goal behind NCW doctrine and force transformation is the 
construction of a military that can win across “the range of military operations” or 
“spectrum of conflict” through the application superior firepower at the decisive point 
and time on the battlefield (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000; Mitchell, 2006). This goal 
depends on leveraging information technology and networks to connect sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein 2000; Mitchell, 2006). The assertion is 
that a “networked” force can win through “information superiority” and fight more 
proactively, flexibly and responsively against threats on the battlefield (Alberts, Garstka, 
& Stein, 2000; Mitchell, 2006).  
The fundamentally opposite theory of victory McCormick describes raises a set of 
unique issues associated with the COIN environment that plague NCW concepts. For 
instance, the necessary focus on the population demanded by COIN means there are no 
decisive points on the battlefield in the traditional military sense. Furthermore, NCW 
doctrine assumes the information needed by decision makers and shooters can be 
obtained through the network’s sensors. Typically, the sensors are electronic or human. 
Unfortunately, enemy insurgents are often “tied to the [population] through blood or 
marriage or long association” (Nagl, 2005, p. xiii). Thus, enemy combatants are often 
undetectable by any means until they commit an act, or until a blood relative or close 
associate chooses to turn them in to authorities. Last, NCW concepts assume that success 
can be achieved through largely kinetic means directed at enemy combatants. 
Considering the above description of the unconventional theory of victory, NCW appears 
decidedly conventional.  
Thus, applying NCW concepts (as they currently exist) in an unconventional 
conflict such as COIN, is likely to be very problematic. This is perhaps why the U.S. 
Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual states in the introduction: “The 
military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome 
their institutional inclination to wage conventional warfare against insurgents” (U.S. 
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Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. lii).  While choosing 
the appropriate military strategy for fighting and winning counterinsurgency is certainly 
important, at least three other fundamental organizing strategic concepts remain. The 
second concept is related to the first, but revolves around the tension that exists between 
achieving democracy and security. U.S. national security strategy discusses this concept 
in detail and clearly emphasizes the importance of achieving democracy in places the like 
Iraq (United States National Security Strategy, 2006). However, focusing too much on 
democratization and too little on security can present a problem (Iraq Strategy Review, 
2007). 
2. Democracy or Security: A Chicken or Egg Dilemma 
A primary objective of America’s Global War on Terror is to preserve and 
strengthen the international system of states and secure the United States by defeating al-
Qaida and other insurgent groups that threaten emerging or existing democracies (United 
States National Security Strategy, 2006). The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006 
describes America’s grand strategy underpinning the GWOT as one promoting 
democratic movements in every region and culture of the world. According to this 
strategy, democratic governments are the most responsible actors within the international 
system. As responsible actors, they can be most relied upon to combat international 
terrorism and insurgency. The assertion continues that if stability can be obtained in the 
cradle of democracy, support for al-Qaida and other insurgent groups will dry up. In sum, 
the 2006 NSS asserts that security will follow democracy. However, the research 
contends an opposing view that is gaining acceptance among military strategists: that 
security must precede democracy (U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, 2007, p. xlii; Galula, 2006). This is an important distinction because it gives rise 
to a fundamental cause for implementing population-centric projects like the Human 
Terrain System.  
Perhaps the biggest roadblock to America’s early approach to stability, security 
and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has been its conventional focus on killing 
insurgents while securing the population from insurgent attacks (U.S. Army and Marine 
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Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. xlii). As the need for a surge strategy in 
Iraq demonstrated, the early focus on killing insurgents while building democratic 
institutions proved insufficient (Iraq Strategy Review, 2007). Proponents of the surge 
argue that by securing the population first, the counterinsurgent (e.g., the United States in 
Iraq) will be afforded the opportunity to compel popular support, undermine the 
insurgency, and eventually establish the preferred form of government – hence, they 
believe security precedes democracy (Iraq Strategy Review, 2007).  
It is important to note that the population-centric approach to COIN is particularly 
uncomfortable for conventional militaries because it requires an incremental strategy for 
compelling popular cooperation as a way of defeating insurgents. Worse yet, these 
incremental steps may take a very long time and may include decidedly non-kinetic 
activities (U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. xvii). 
For the United States military that is trained, equipped, and organized to apply superior 
firepower at the decisive point on the battlefield to achieve rapid success, this represents 
a difficult challenge (Joint Vision, 2020; Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000, p. 2; Mitchell, 
2006).  
While focusing on the population and achieving security through a slow and 
incremental COIN strategy represents a different approach for conventional militaries 
rehearsed in performing swift decisive military maneuvers, overcoming the institutional 
challenges to achieve change is necessary (U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual 2007, pg. lii).  Upending the traditional insurgent-centric approach requires 
at least in part knowing the comparative advantages and disadvantages associated with 
the insurgent and counterinsurgent. This is the focus of the next section.  
3. Insurgency/COIN: Overcoming Comparative Disadvantages 
At the beginning of an insurgency an asymmetry exists between the insurgent and 
the counterinsurgent (McCormick, Horton, & Harrison, 2007, p. 323; Galula, 2006, p. 3; 
O’Neill, 2005, p. 93). McCormick asserts the insurgent possesses an information 
advantage while the counterinsurgent (e.g., the state) possesses a force advantage. Being 
able to see the counterinsurgent while remaining invisible among the population is the 
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information advantage associated with the insurgent. This advantage (derived only from a 
cooperating population) enables the insurgent to choose the time and place of 
engagement, yielding him the initiative (Galula, 2006, p. 9). Conversely, while the 
insurgent enjoys an information advantage, he suffers from an opening force 
disadvantage (Galula, 2006, p. 4). This is because the insurgency usually starts out as a 
small group and comparatively lacks the material resources available to the state. It must 
therefore grow to win (Galula, 2006, p. 4). The counterinsurgent on the other hand is 
usually the state in power and is therefore by default a force in being. It must prevent the 
insurgency from growing while simultaneously preserving or extending its authority, 
capability, and legitimacy in order to win (Schaner, 2008b; Galula, 2006, p. 4). 
The key to insurgent success is remaining undetectable during the critical period 
of growth (McCormick, Horton, & Harrison, 2007, p. 323; Taber, 2002). Provided some 
segment of the population supports the insurgency, the insurgent will “retain his liberty to 
refuse battle except on his own terms” (Galula, 2006, p. 9). McCormick elaborates by 
asserting that as the insurgency grows it becomes harder to remain invisible and keep 
growing at the same time. This paradox establishes the requirement for an insurgent to 
remain invisible until it overcomes its comparative force disadvantage. Note that both the 
material resources and the anonymity the insurgent needs come from the population 
(Galula, 2006, p. 52). Likewise, because the population knows collectively who among 
them supports the insurgency the population is the key to dismantling it (Schaner, 2008b; 
Galula, 2006, p. 50; Nagl, 2005, p. xiii). Hence, the population once again is identified as 
the objective for the counterinsurgent. In sum, the struggle between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent is best described as a struggle to adapt, and overcome comparative 
disadvantages by compelling the support of the population. This highlights the primacy 
of the population in COIN and leads us to the final concept necessary for organizing 
COIN strategy – establishing control of the population.  
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4. Controlling the Population and Mobilizing its Support 
If both sides of an insurgent/counterinsurgent struggle are pursuing the population 
to overcome their comparative disadvantages, then they are effectively avoiding a 
strategy that emphasizes direct confrontation with each other (Galula, 2006, p. 34). This 
unconventional approach requires establishing control of the population and sets control 
as a prerequisite of mobilizing popular support (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. 15).  
Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual links 
control with mobilization (p. 15), McCormick links control first to stability and then 
describes it as a function of consensus and compellance. Moreover, McCormick’s 
definition of control also supports the notion of mobilization. He defines control from the 
counterinsurgent’s perspective as his “ability to see opposition and to influence what he 
sees” (Schaner, 2008b). McCormick expands upon this definition by saying the “degree 
to which [the counterinsurgent] can’t see or influence is the degree to which [he doesn’t] 
have control.” It logically follows that the degree to which a counterinsurgent exercises 
control directly correlates to his ability to separate insurgents from the population and to 
mobilize its support (Nagl, 2005, p. 28; Galula, 2006). Thus, control emerges as a critical 
requirement for both sides.  
McCormick’s definition of control emphasizes the counterinsurgent’s ability to 
“see and influence.” This implies control is dependent upon the counterinsurgent’s ability 
to see and influence the behaviors and choices of the population (Galula, 2006; Nagl, 
2005). From the counterinsurgent’s perspective, the ability to see and influence is a 
function of the regime’s ability to provide security, justice, and governance to the local 
people (Galula, 2006, p. 3; U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, 2007). It also implies that the counterinsurgent must know how culture, social 
networks, language, and history may influence popular decisions and behavior. This is 
where the Human Terrain System comes into play. By helping the counterinsurgent know 
and incorporate these influential behavioral factors, the HTS contributes to the 
establishment of control. 
 10
The above concepts are introduced in this chapter as generalized concepts 
necessary for organizing COIN strategy. The research does not contend the above items 
to be a comprehensive list. These items are however unique to this research and the 
Human Terrain System. In one way or another, each of the above concepts is related to 
the HTS. For instance, the HTS exists precisely to help the U.S. military operate more 
effectively in the COIN environment by learning and focusing on the population. This 
emphasis helps drive American units to focus on population security, comparative 
advantages and disadvantages, and improving control and cooperation. 
B. THE HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM (HTS) 
This thesis evaluates the HTS to determine its viability as a concept supporting a 
population-centric approach to COIN. The HTS project is intended to provide a 
significant capability that improves the ability of military personnel to comprehend, 
integrate with, and operate more effectively among foreign populations. Furthermore, the 
HTS is designed to provide rich experiential knowledge of the population critical for 
achieving success in COIN operations. The principle capability resident within the 
Human Terrain System designed to create and share this rich knowledge is the Human 
Terrain Team (HTT). The uniqueness of the Human Terrain Team concept stems from its 
comprising members. Teams are made up of an experienced cultural anthropologist or 
social scientist who is accompanied by other highly trained cultural analysts. These 
members bring with them requisite skills necessary for deriving relevant cultural and 
social information that was not previously obtainable with U.S. military personnel. 
Members are currently embedded within military units (e.g., U.S. Army Brigade Combat 
Teams (BCTs)) tasked with performing COIN and national building operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
The unique capability associated with the HTS and its component HTTs hinges on 
the power and privilege of relationships (e.g., between HTT/military members and host 
nation citizens, and HTT members and host military unit staff members) and the use of 
special social science research tools and tradecraft. The result is, in theory, a niche 
capability that aims to provide accelerated research-based advice to the host military unit. 
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The project is designed to build these relationships and create the conditions that permit 
wider acceptance of U.S. intervention. In principle, the HTS concept leverages the power 
of knowledge to bridge the cultural and perceptual divide that separates Americans from 
their local human environment. This establishes why the HTS is a force for change. The 
remainder of this thesis is dedicated to examining more critically and rigorously exactly 
how the HTS concept provides a significant and unique capability that yields a 
competitive advantage for America in its COIN and nation building efforts in the Global 
War on Terror. It is within this vein that the research emphasizes the notion that 
knowledge (particularly cultural knowledge) is powerful and critical in a population-
centric approach to COIN and nation building (Leites & Wolf, 1970, p. 137; Nissen, 
2006, p. 3).  
C. THE NEED FOR AN HTS RESEARCH PROJECT 
The proof-of-concept deployment of the embedded Human Terrain Team (HTT) 
in 2007 appears to have demonstrated the value of employing highly skilled social 
scientists to aid the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency efforts (HTT Preliminary 
Assessment, 2007). Although this is a new initiative, and no comprehensive independent 
evaluation of the project’s efficacy has been undertaken to date, military commanders 
who benefited from HTT research in the field have hailed the project’s contributions 
(HTT Preliminary Assessment, 2007). For instance, consider the comments made by 
Colonel Mick Nicholson in an interview with the Human Terrain System Assessment 
Team (HTSAT) in August of 2007:  
Without the HTT filter on the COA’s [courses of action] and the 
alternative maneuver tools they identified to create the exact same effect, 
we would have lost double the lives and would have had double the 
contacts. The US military has been here for years now and this unit [82nd 
Airborne] has been here for two rotations, and it’s had no effect until now. 
Moreover, the Preliminary Assessment which was conducted by the HTSAT 
concludes the following impact of the proof-of-concept HTT deployment that occurred in 
Afghanistan in 2007.  
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The HTT has had a profound effect on the brigade, assisting them 
reducing their kinetic operations, developing more effective courses of 
action, improving their situational awareness, improving their 
consequence management, increasing support for the host nation 
government, improving their intelligence collection and analysis, 
improving the brigade’s humanitarian assistance efforts, improving their 
village assessments, improving their information operations, decreasing 
attacks by enemy forces, and decreasing ordinary crime in the area of 
operations, among other things. 
The HTT Preliminary Assessment was conducted by the HTSAT through a series 
of interviews and observations at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno from July 26 to 
August 10, 2007 (HTT Preliminary Assessment, 2007). 
The anecdotal evidence of initial HTT/HTS success has received media attention, 
and has caused controversy within academia (Rohde, 2007). The HTS project is 
controversial because many anthropologists outside of the project believe the concept 
breaches the ethics of the participating professionals (Rohde, 2007). As a result, there is a 
growing movement among American anthropologists to join in opposition of the HTS 
project (Rohde, 2007). Other opponents to the HTS initiative include some military 
thinkers. They believe the HTS initiative is simply insufficient. They argue that instead of 
creating new capabilities, the U.S. military should better train, equip and employ already 
existent capabilities to achieve better results. Contrasting this swell of opposition with 
growing demand for HTS products and services raises the need to examine the HTS 
project from an independent, theoretically based, and rigorous perspective to help flesh 
out these issues. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research project is designed to examine one of the many post proof-of-
concept Human Terrain Teams currently deployed. The focal organization, named IZ6, is 
embedded within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) of the 1st Armored Division 
(1AD). The research is aimed at determining if the HTS concept provides competitive 
advantage, and whether it helps drive the U.S. military to pursue a more effective 
population-centric strategy. The fundamental assumption and starting point for this thesis 
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is that a population-centric approach to COIN is the right approach in most COIN and 
nation building environments. The research also aims to determine exactly how the HTS 
concept provides a unique knowledge-based competitive advantage in BCT operations. 
To achieve this, the research project is designed to examine the focal organization 
through several theoretical perspectives including Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic 
Diamond Model (a theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency), Institution Theory, and 
Knowledge Flow Theory. Of the three theories used, Knowledge Flow Theory provides 
the core framework and technique for the analysis provided in Chapter IV. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the claims of success of the HTT proof-of-concept deployment in 
Afghanistan, and the controversy that the HTS concept stirs, an independent research 
project is necessary. To achieve the research objective, the analysis leverages existing 
theories to develop an overarching theoretical explanation of HTS success in the COIN 
environment. The analysis also focuses on how the HTS generates a knowledge-based 
competitive advantage. Hence, the analysis is organized to answer the following research 
questions: (1) How do enhanced population-centric HTT knowledge flows contribute to 
BCT competitive advantage? (2) How does the focal organization advance a population-
centric strategy? 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Each chapter of this thesis is designed to progress in a logical flow beginning with 
the fundamental assumption that a population-centric approach in COIN and nation 
building is the most appropriate strategy. From this, the evaluation of the focal 
organization ensues. The balance of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II – Background. From a broad perspective, this chapter discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings and assumptions supporting the research. In doing so, this 
chapter summarizes the Mystic Diamond Model (a theory of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency), Institution Theory, and Knowledge-Flow Theory. These theories are 
leveraged implicitly and explicitly later in the research to evaluate how the focal 
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organization addresses the demands of the dynamic and complex operational 
environment. Chapter II also introduces the HTS organization including its mission, 
structure, and operational concept. Finally, Chapter II discusses in more detail the 
controversy and opposition to the HTS project. This is of great relevance to the HTS 
project as it may impact future recruiting efforts. 
Chapter III – Research Method. Chapter III provides a detailed discussion of 
the case study method used. For instance, to address the research questions above, the 
analysis is based on a literature review of Knowledge-Flow Theory, Institution Theory, 
theories of insurgency/counterinsurgency. Additionally, interviews of experts associated 
with the HTS and the focal organization are conducted to obtain qualitative data 
necessary for analysis. All of the data are inductively analyzed to develop a better 
understanding of how the focal organization contributes to BCT competitive advantage 
and advances a population-centric strategy.  
Chapter IV – Results. This chapter examines three narrative accounts provided 
by IZ6 that describe the HTT’s embedded operations. The chapter uses concepts and 
methods consistent with Knowledge Flow Theory to show how IZ6 creates, shares, and 
harnesses knowledge of the population to improve the BCT’s competitive potential and 
advance a population-centric strategy. By drawing from the analysis, the chapter 
generalizes themes that establish the basis for enhanced competitive performance. It also 
identifies potential pathologies that could diminish or inhibit competitive potential over 
time. The themes drawn in the chapter directly answer the research questions and 
establish the basis for Chapter V. 
Chapter V – Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter provides several 
conclusions that can be inferred from the research results. Additionally, the chapter 
discusses the research results in the context of the HTS project controversy to draw a 
broader set of potential knowledge flow pathologies that need to be addressed. This 
broader set of pathologies combined with HTT specific pathologies provides the basis for 
closing recommendations.   
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G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis provides an evaluation of the embedded Human Terrain Team concept 
and the Human Terrain System as a whole from a unique theoretical perspective that 
combines Institution Theory, McCormick’s theory of insurgency/counterinsurgency, and 
Knowledge Flow Theory. Therefore, the research contributes a new way of describing the 
merits of the HTS concept as they relate to evolving the project and diffusing 
controversy. The research directly attributes embedded HTT operations with enhancing a 
supported unit’s competitive potential by creating, sharing, and harnessing persistent 
knowledge of the population. Moreover, the research demonstrates how the embedded 
HTT concept advances a population-centric strategy to COIN and nation building by 
increasing the number and improving the quality of social interactions between military 
personnel and the civilian population. The research also reveals hurdles to success if 
certain policies and capabilities are not implemented over time. To address these 
pathologies, the research provides specific recommendations that can help ensure future 
success.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides important background information necessary to understand 
the problem addressed through this research, and the research approach undertaken. It 
first describes the combined theoretical perspective used to frame this research, and then 
provides details associated with the HTS, HTT, and associated controversy. 
A. A COMBINED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The theoretical framework used in this research reflects a necessary combination 
of several theories and models. Each theory provides a unique construct for 
understanding one or more aspects of the dynamic COIN environment and the Human 
Terrain System. By leveraging established and emerging theories and models, the 
mission, organization, and operational concept of the HTS can be evaluated within the 
complex COIN environment. This evaluation can identify potential strengths and 
weaknesses of the current HTS project, and assess how well the overall concept supports 
a population-centric strategy to COIN operations. This first section includes discussion of 
three theories and models: (1) Mystic Diamond Model; (2) Institution Theory; and (3) 
Knowledge-Flow Theory.  
1. Mystic Diamond: A Model for Insurgency/COIN Strategy 
Models represent important theoretically based tools for organizing thoughts and 
analyses. Dr. Gordon H. McCormick developed the Mystic Diamond Model of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency as a mechanism for understanding and evaluating 
insurgent/counterinsurgent contests. The model explains these competitions as rivaling 
dynamic processes that convert inputs into outputs. The purpose of these processes is to 
yield outputs that extend the competitors’ authority. Increased authority allows 




authority. The goal of each competitor is to use the process (guided by strategy) to 
expand his authority effectively enough to squeeze the opponent out of the contested 
political space. Figure 1 shows the Mystic Diamond Model adapted to this research.  
 
 
Figure 1.   McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model. 
The model identifies four main entities relevant to the competition and places 
them at the four points of the diamond. On the left is the state (counterinsurgent), on the 
right the counter-state (insurgent group). At the top is the population and at the bottom is 
the international actor. The dashed lines between points on the diamond represent an 
infrastructure and relationship connecting each group to either the population or the 
international actor. Through its infrastructure, the competitor converts inputs into outputs. 
For instance, the infrastructure connecting the core insurgent group with the population is 
the governance and administrative control the core exercises over the population. The 
stronger the connection, the more effectively the core group can assert its authority and 
control over the population. As this connection strengthens, the easier it becomes to 
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mobilize the population to provide additional inputs (e.g., people, guns, and money). 
These inputs are used to extend further the core group’s authority and control, and 
contribute to a self perpetuating growth cycle (Schaner, 2008c). 
It should be noted that the process works exactly the same way for the state. 
However, in this case, the state is seeking knowledge of the insurgency as the input from 
the population. Through the state’s infrastructure, it can convert this input into an output 
that also extends its authority in a self perpetuating cycle. The output from the state’s 
perspective is improved protection of the population from insurgent activities. If the state 
can demonstrate its ability to secure the population from insurgents, then it will gain 
credibility, extend its authority, and ultimately displace or defeat the insurgency. The 
state achieves success if it can dry up support for the insurgency and extend its authority, 
legitimacy, and control over the contested population and political space (Schaner, 
2008c). 
The Mystic Diamond Model is based fundamentally on two opening arguments. 
First, in the beginning phase of conflict an asymmetry of capability exists between the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent. This asymmetry, as described in Chapter I, is the 
insurgent’s and counterinsurgent’s comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
knowledge and force. Briefly, the counterinsurgent (usually the state in power) has a 
force advantage, but knowledge disadvantage. Conversely, the insurgent has a knowledge 
advantage, but force disadvantage. The insurgent’s knowledge advantage is obtained 
from a supportive population in the form of anonymity. This anonymity trumps the 
counterinsurgent’s traditional means of collecting intelligence, and enables the insurgent 
to exercise the initiative by choosing the time and place of attack. Unlike conventional 
conflict, opponents in this environment must compete first to win the population to 
overcome their comparative disadvantages. The population can provide either knowledge 
to the counterinsurgent or material resources to the insurgent. Hence, the population 
holds the key to success for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent (Schaner, 2008c). 
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The second argument that gives rise to the Mystic Diamond Model is related to 
the first – that the state is a force in being and the insurgency is a force in development. 
The implications of this argument are that the insurgency needs to grow to win, and the 
state needs to displace or suppress the insurgency below its breakpoint to win. Both sides 
attempt to overcome their disadvantages by expanding their authority. Expanded 
authority strengthens the connection that either the insurgent or counterinsurgent has with 
the population. A strengthened connection yields an improved ability to convert inputs 
into outputs. Again, the population holds the key for both opponents. The insurgents 
depend on the population to grow because they can provide material resources and 
support. Conversely, the population can inform the state of insurgent activities if it is so 
compelled (Schaner, 2008c). 
From these opening arguments, the model describes insurgency and 
counterinsurgency as a symmetrical feedback system of strategies incorporating a series 
of inputs, processes, and outputs. Frequently, conflicts involving insurgent groups are 
referred to as “asymmetric.” This is not entirely accurate from a strategic perspective. 
Insurgent/counterinsurgent struggles are symmetrical (as described by the Mystic 
Diamond Model) because both sides must pursue the same sequence of strategies to 
defeat the other (e.g., work to win the population’s support first) (Schaner, 2008c). 
The primary implication of the Mystic Diamond Model is that both the insurgent 
and counterinsurgent should pursue a path to victory through a sequential series of 
strategies that initially focuses on the population. Note in Figure 1 that these strategies 
are indicated by the numbered arrows emanating from the opposing groups and are 
pointing to either the population or the opponent’s infrastructure or core group. It is 
important to note here that the Mystic Diamond Model is scalable. One can use it to 
perceive or evaluate a contest at the national-strategic level or at the village level. Thus, 
when applying the model, it must be recognized that in one village it may be appropriate 
for the counterinsurgent to pursue strategy 1, while in another; the counterinsurgent may 
be able to pursue strategy 2 or 3. Additionally, the Model does not prohibit applying 
strategy 3 if the population provides enabling knowledge. However, the Model cautions 
that by beginning with and emphasizing strategy 3 a counterinsurgent is likely to alienate 
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the population, act indiscriminately (even though unintentionally), and is likely to 
produce more insurgents than he kills by his numerous discrete kinetic actions. Instead, 
pursuing the sequence of strategies prescribed above, the counterinsurgent is more likely 
to win by undermining the insurgency with the population’s support (Schaner, 2008c). 
While the Mystic Diamond Model prescribes an appropriate sequencing of 
strategies for the counterinsurgent, operationalizing these strategies can be difficult. 
Strategy 1 in particular is difficult for an intervening counterinsurgent like the United 
States in Iraq or Afghanistan. Compelling the population’s support in a completely 
foreign environment provides unique barriers such as language, culture, and ingrained 
mistrust. Chapter I noted that ensuring security of the population doesn’t guarantee its 
cooperation. The barriers noted above are the reasons for this lack of guarantee. To gain 
the population’s cooperation, the counterinsurgent must ensure his authority and control 
of the population doesn’t undermine or disrespect the people’s cultural and societal rules, 
norms, and beliefs. To illustrate that compelling popular support requires more than 
providing security, we turn briefly to the example of the “Awakening” of Anbar province 
in Iraq 2007. 
Recent inroads made by the United States military in Anbar province can in large 
part be attributed to al-Qaida’s blundering disregard for the social and cultural rules, 
norms, and beliefs of the people they controlled (Michaels, 2007). Al-Qaida’s murderous 
methods of “security” combined with radical social and cultural infringement’s caused 
the tribes of Anbar province to collectively seek American protection (Kilcullen, 2007). 
This movement has been labeled the “Anbar Awakening” and stands out as a promising 
sign for U.S. efforts in Iraq.  
Since the Awakening began, U.S. forces have had the opportunity to build upon 
initial success by strengthening ties with the population (Michaels, 2007). By adopting 
culturally intelligent and appropriate methods of engaging sheiks and the population, the 
U.S. has successfully maintained a vastly improved security situation in Anbar (Michaels, 
2007). In essence, the Awakening provides a real world example of the Mystic Diamond 
Model in action. Following the Mystic Diamond Model, the counterinsurgent is 
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compelled to pursue the population first. The blundering actions of al-Qaida significantly 
alienated the people of Anbar, and this affect provided the opportunity for American 
forces to engage the population and compel its support.  
The lesson learned from Anbar is that the counterinsurgent must ensure security 
and services in a way that is respectful of the people’s social and cultural rules, norms, 
and beliefs. Only then can the counterinsurgent hope to compel active popular support 
and cooperation. This example also serves to illustrate how important security and the 
demonstration of cultural respect and knowledge are with respect to influencing popular 
perceptions, preferences, and behaviors. The focus on understanding and influencing 
popular behaviors leads us to Institution Theory and the need to discuss how this theory 
explains the behaviors of social entities (Kilcullen, 2007). 
2. Institution Theory 
Institution Theory provides an effective way of looking at any social phenomenon 
(including insurgency/counterinsurgency). This theory is based on the premise that 
“institutions are the foundation of social life,” and that behaviors of social entities or 
collectives (e.g., members of a society, or ethnic groups) are directed by rules, norms, 
and beliefs (Campbell, 2004; Scott, 2001). This provides a very useful construct for 
understanding why social entities or collectives behave the way they do as they interact 
with their environment. For instance, Institution Theory can be leveraged to explain why 
insurgent groups form, why they act, and why people support or don’t support them. In 
essence, Institution Theory can be applied in the insurgency/counterinsurgency context to 
understand human behaviors and decisions as they are influenced by rules, norms and 
beliefs. Understanding human behavior is crucially important for the research because the 
Human Terrain System is expressly designed to obtain this kind of knowledge and supply 




Examining Institution Theory more closely reveals that rules amount to explicit 
“regulative processes” such as policies, laws, inspection routines, workplace rules and 
incentives. This first layer of influences represents a coercive regulator of behavior 
because it is imposed and enforced by the rule of law to cause acceptance. A rule’s 
legitimacy rests largely on the imposing entity’s ability to enforce it (Nissen, 2007, p. 5). 
The second of the three regulative processes, norms, represents morally accepted 
practices by the social collective. These behaviors are governed by normative 
mechanisms and are based on a more tacit and collective understanding of what is 
acceptable or not acceptable outside the strict letter of the law. Thus, norms are the 
accepted means by which a collective social entity pursues a set of goals. A norm’s 
legitimacy is largely based on a social entity’s collective moral acceptance – an 
expectation – of the practice (Nissen, 2007, p. 5; Johnson, 1982, p. 44). 
The third and last regulative process of Institution Theory is belief system. A 
collective social entity’s beliefs are perhaps the most tacit and influential regulative 
process governing its behavior. When members of a social system share a common set of 
beliefs, the adherence to accepted behaviors will likely persist and be difficult to change 
over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (e.g., security, survival, and honor) 
are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept or reject rules and norms (Nissen, 
2007, p. 6). 
In the insurgency/counterinsurgency context, Institution Theory is applied by 
relating it to a discussion of revolutionary causes offered by Chalmers Johnson in his 
book Revolutionary Change. He argues that insurgencies can develop when a society 
becomes critically disequilibrated, and when a motivated revolutionary group perceives 
an opportunity for seizing power from below (Johnson, 1982, p. 62). According to 
Johnson, social disequilibrium can occur when a governing authority’s policies (rules) 
fail to meet the expectations (norms) and values (beliefs) of society. He refers to these as 
endogenous causes and notes that certain other exogenous causes (e.g., military conquest, 
trade, introduction of new technologies etc.) can also contribute to disequilibrium 
(Johnson, 1982, p. 72).  Note the association of policies, expectations, and values to rules, 
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norms, and beliefs respectively. The alignment of these behavioral drivers provides the 
link that enables Institution Theory to explain the causes of insurgency and social 
behavior. 
Going a step further, Johnson describes the conditions within a disequilibrated 
society likely to give rise to revolution. For instance, if the governing party refuses to 
address or is actually incapable of addressing the root causes of social disequilibrium, 
then the government begins to suffer from “power deflation” (Johnson, 1982, p. 72) The 
problem is exacerbated when the government begins to suffer from a “loss of authority” 
This occurs when the government is no longer perceived by a segment of its constituent 
population as capable or legitimate. This loss causes any government use force to be 
perceived as ill-legitimate and worthy of opposition. It is as this point that insurgent 
groups may begin to take root in segments of the population most disconnected from the 
government. This condition is described in the Mystic Diamond Model as the weakening 
or loss of the dashed line between the government and the population. This condition is 
also described by Institution Theory as the point where a population segment’s collective 
beliefs drive its behavior toward ignoring government rules and supporting alternative 
emergent authorities (e.g., an insurgent group that demonstrates control where the 
government does not).  
To appropriately scope the application of Institution Theory to this research, it is 
appropriate to consider its application under circumstances where the contest persists 
(e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan), and is therefore relatively evenly matched. This means that 
neither the state nor insurgent group suffers from wholesale power deflation or authority 
loss across the entire population and is capable of wielding some influence and control 
across various contested segments of the population. If this were not the case, then the 
contest would be over and one side would win. Therefore, to be useful for the analysis, 
Institution Theory is applied where an evenly matched contest requires reliance upon 
strategy to win – enter the Mystic Diamond Model (Schaner, 2008c). Furthermore, 




counterinsurgent has established an acceptable degree of security, and where observing 
social and cultural rules, norms, and beliefs are recognized as essential for compelling 
active cooperation.  
In summary, Institution Theory provides a window into understanding why 
insurgent groups form, why they act, and why people support or don’t support them. 
When combined with Chalmers Johnson’s description of revolutionary causes and 
disequilibrated social systems, we see that rules, norms, and beliefs correlate with 
policies, expectations, and values. For instance, when a government’s policies (rules) 
don’t measure up to constituent expectations (norms) and values (beliefs) then the social 
system becomes disequilibrated and the seeds for insurgency begin to sow. Additionally, 
Institution Theory describes insurgency as a social phenomenon dependent on popular 
perceptions of authority, capability, and legitimacy. These perceptions (tacit beliefs) are 
what will most likely decide who succeeds or fails in the insurgent/counterinsurgent 
struggle. Thus, the struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent over the contested 
political space is population-centric and perception based, and therefore waged squarely 
in the information and knowledge domains. It is therefore fitting to discuss next 
Knowledge-Flow Theory as a framework for describing the dynamics of this domain. 
3. Knowledge Flow Theory 
Knowledge-Flow Theory applied within the COIN context complements 
Institution Theory. Where Institution Theory reinforces perceptions and beliefs as 
principle drivers of popular attitudes and decisions, Knowledge-Flow Theory provides a 
framework for evaluating how information and knowledge move about the competitive 
space to influence these drivers. Furthermore, Knowledge-Flow Theory can be used to 
examine specific knowledge producing and harnessing organizations like the HTS to 
determine how they use knowledge “flows” to yield a competitive advantage. This thesis 
leverages Knowledge-Flow Theory to examine how the HTS creates, organizes, 
formalizes, and shares social and cultural knowledge to enhance the counterinsurgent’s 
(e.g., host brigade) competitive advantage.  
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a. Knowledge Uniqueness 
Knowledge-Flow Theory begins with a definition that knowledge is 
different from information or data such that it enables one to take action (e.g., decide 
which side to support, selectively engage a counterinsurgent, conduct COIN operations 
etc.) (Nissen, 2006). Where information and data serve to inform knowledge by 
providing meaning and context, or reduce uncertainty, knowledge is uniquely powerful 
because it represents an asset that directly enables action and increases competitive 
potential (Grant, 1996; Nissen, 2006). Going a step further, Knowledge-Flow Theory 
differentiates between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. The theory links the 
competitive potential of either type of knowledge to its uniqueness. The more unique a 
piece of knowledge is, the more unevenly distributed it is (Nissen, 2006).  
According to the theory, knowledge distribution correlates directly to 
competitive potential. For instance, knowledge that is evenly distributed across the 
competitive space should confer no competitive advantage to either side because both 
sides have it. However, explicit knowledge that can be kept secret or tacit knowledge that 
cannot be easily transferred is said to be unevenly distributed. The uneven distribution of 
knowledge across the competitive space confers a competitive advantage to the entity 
possessing it. Thus, Knowledge-Flow Theory directly links the power of knowledge – its 
competitive potential – with its degree of uniqueness and as a function of its distribution 
across the competitive space. The notion of knowledge distribution implies that 
knowledge moves multidimensionally across the competitive space and reveals next 
major concept of Knowledge-Flow Theory – the concept that knowledge flows (Nissen, 
2006). 
b. Knowledge Flows 
According to Knowledge-Flow Theory, explicit knowledge, which 
transfers easily, tends to distribute itself evenly across the competitive space. Methods of 
explicit knowledge transfer such as the spoken word, written messages, visual images, 
radio messages, or computer networks represent common means by which knowledge 
bearing entities choose to distribute this kind of knowledge. In contrast, slower methods 
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of tacit knowledge transfer such as behavioral observation, mentorship, story telling and 
learning-by-doing exist, and are used to make tacit knowledge move across knowledge 
bearing entities. Tacit knowledge is said to be “sticky” and uniquely contained within 
knowledge bearing entities (e.g., individuals or groups). Additionally, tacit knowledge is 
highly influenced by individual or group culture, language, and situational context – 
properties that are in and of themselves highly tacit and unique (Nissen, 2006). 
Referring briefly back to the Mystic Diamond Model, the knowledge 
obtained from the population about insurgents correlates with the input needed by the 
counterinsurgent from the population. The counterinsurgent obtains this knowledge 
through a combination of explicit and tacit knowledge flows. For instance, a local tribal 
leader may choose to inform the counterinsurgent of the activities of an insurgent 
(explicit knowledge flow). However, compelling the tribal leader to give this knowledge 
may first require engaging him over an extended period of time and learning his 
behavioral drivers. This in and of itself represents a potentially long and slow process of 
tacit knowledge flow through direct observation, interactive experiences, and trust 
building (Nissen, 2006). 
The above example illustrates why tacit knowledge tends to flow more 
slowly, but tends to yield a higher competitive potential. The notion of taking a deliberate 
and “slow” approach to earn the trust of a tribal leader illustrates the kind of knowledge 
that is ultimately most important in COIN – tacit knowledge of the population. While the 
HTS provides means for creating and sharing both explicit and tacit knowledge, the 
emphasis of the research is on tacit knowledge flows generated by the HTS. Given the 
dynamism and multidimensional aspects of the competitive COIN environment, 
knowledge that flows between or among competitors or allies may follow complex paths. 
For Knowledge-Flow Theory to be useful for the analysis, knowledge flows are 
examined according to various dimensions. The Theory describes a method of visualizing 
knowledge as it flows across these dimensions. Next we discuss knowledge dimensions as 
the third and last important concept of Knowledge-Flow Theory (Nissen, 2006). 
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c. Knowledge Dimensions 
Knowledge-Flow Theory provides the knowledge flow diagram to 
visualize knowledge flows across a competitive space. The vertical axis of this graph 
represents knowledge explicitness – the degree to which knowledge can be codified.  The 
horizontal axis represents the reach a piece of knowledge exhibits across an organization 
(e.g., HTT, brigade, population). This dimension provides a measure of the degree to 
which knowledge (whether explicit or tacit) has been socialized from an individual to a 
group, and from a group its broader organization or population (e.g., from a small 
segment to a large segment of a society). The third axis represents the knowledge life 
cycle dimension. This dimension characterizes the type of activity associated with a 
knowledge flow (e.g., create, share, apply). The three axes noted above are combined 
with the fourth dimension of time, depicted as a thin or thick line indicating the relative 
speed of a knowledge flow. A thick line represents a relatively slow knowledge flow 
usually associated with tacit knowledge flows. Conversely, explicit knowledge flows are 
typically depicted with thinner lines implying a more speedy transfer rate.  Figure 2 




Figure 2.   Knowledge Flow Visualization (From Nissen, 2006). 
This graph is used in the analysis to examine HTT knowledge flows. More 
specifically, the thesis uses this analytical tool identify how the HTT produces and shares 
important knowledge with the host brigade and the population. In essence, the knowledge 
flow diagram will highlight how the HTT performs its bridging functions.  
Examining the graph more carefully, we see in this generic example how 
knowledge flow patterns relate to four knowledge-flow processes: socialization, 
externalization, combination, internalization (Nonaka, 1994; Nissen, 2006). Beginning 
with point A, we see tacit knowledge created at the individual level (e.g., HTT member 
develops innate sense of a tribal leader’s character and motives). The flow from point A 
to B represents the socialization and sharing of this piece of tacit knowledge to the group 
level (e.g., other HTT members as they interact with tribal leader).  
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From point B to C we observe the externalization flow. This represents the 
codification and formalization of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge at the group level 
(e.g., HTT produces a written personality profile of tribal leader). Note that is process 
correlates with what was noted above as the producer’s codification of the tacit 
knowledge into an explicit form.  
The combination flow from point C to D reflects a movement 
(transmission) of explicit knowledge to the organization level along the reach dimension 
(e.g., delivery of the personality profile to brigade staff). The combination flow is 
represented by a thinner line because this flow consists almost entirely of explicit 
knowledge that is transferred via some communications means. Members of the brigade 
staff combine this piece of explicit knowledge with what they already collectively know 
about the tribal leader and the broader situation. This increases the brigade’s overall 
knowledge stock.  
Next, the internalization flow from point D to E reflects a movement from 
explicit to tacit knowledge at the same organization level. This happens when the new 
knowledge received is examined within the context of previous experiences and 
knowledge of the leader and the broader situation. Note that this knowledge flow 
correlates with what was previously described as the reconstruction of signals into tacit 
knowledge by the consumer. Hence the D to E knowledge flow vector moves from the 
explicit plane at the organizational level to the tacit plane where the new knowledge 
amounts to a refinement of older knowledge. Finally, we complete the knowledge flow 
loop with a reverse socialization flow from Point E to B.  This flow vector indicates tacit 
knowledge moving from the organization to the group level (Nissen, 2007). 
Now that the knowledge flow diagram has been introduced, the summary 
of Knowledge-Flow Theory is complete. It is now possible to use a combined approach 
in applying the Mystic Diamond Model, Institution Theory, emerging Knowledge Flow 
Theory to evaluate the Human Terrain System. Before the analysis can ensue however, a 
brief introduction of the HTS mission, organization, and basic operational concept from 
the HTT perspective is required.  
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B. THE HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM  
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the incentive to re-learn 
counterinsurgency warfare and to reexamine old COIN doctrine. It is within this context 
that new ideas like the Human Terrain System (HTS) have cropped up with the goal of 
improving knowledge necessary for winning counterinsurgency. The HTS mission, 
organization, and operational concept are designed to compel strategic change by 
implementing change first at the tactical level. Because the HTS embodies an approach to 
warfare that is non-conventional and population centric it represents a kind of conceptual 
insurgency within the massive institution of the U.S. military. The U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps Manual on counterinsurgency describes this sentiment well by asserting the need 
for change and upending conventional concepts. To illustrate, the manual states that “The 
[conventional] approach concentrates on physically destroying the unseen opponent 
embedded in the general population… [This approach is] precisely what the manual 
rejects. Once that signal distinction is drawn, a host of implications follow, upending 
conventional precepts” (U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
2007, p. xxiv). 
1. Mission of the Human Terrain System 
Although much wrangling about the HTS exists among military leaders, 
strategists, and academicians, the project has achieved significant buy-in from the 
Secretary of Defense (Gates, 2008). Buy in from the top combined with anecdotal 
evidence of HTS success in the field will likely continue the pressure to expand and grow 
the project.  
At the most fundamental level, the Human Terrain System and its component 
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are conceived to focus U.S. COIN and nation building 




Conduct operationally-relevant, open-source social science research, and 
provide commanders and staffs at the BCT/RCT and Division levels with 
an embedded knowledge capability, to establish a coherent, analytic 
cultural framework for operational planning, decision-making, and 
assessment (HTS Capabilities Brief, 2007). 
By providing the counterinsurgent with social science research relevant to his 
operations, the HTS is the embodiment of the essential first step toward changing broader 
institutional thought and structure. Highlighting this change further requires relating the 
mission statement to the theoretical framework and the new counterinsurgency manual. 
We achieve this by briefly discussing the social science research techniques used by 
HTTs in the field. Discussing techniques reveals just how different the kind of 
information HTTs obtain really is compared to the kind of information needed to drive 
conventional military operations.  
The techniques used by HTT members are derived primarily from qualitative 
methods associated with ethnographic research (Schaner, 2007). The principle methods 
used by HTT members include: participant observation, informal interviews, and semi-
structured interviews (Schaner, 2007). Briefly, participant observation is cultural 
immersion. When conducting participant observation, the researcher lives and works 
among the people to learn their language and witness patterns of behavior (Fetterman, 
1998, p. 35). Moreover, the goal of the participating observer is to internalize 
fundamental “beliefs, fears, hopes and expectations of the people under study” 
(Fetterman, 1998, p. 35). Additionally, HTT members frequently conduct informal 
interviews (open ended casual conversations) while they are observing through 
participation. Participant observation and informal interviewing is somewhat haphazard 
and unsystematic. However, these open ended techniques provide a much needed 
baseline help determine more refined research methods such as interviews, projective 
techniques, and questionnaires (Fetterman, 1998, p. 35).  
The third principle method HTT members use to learn the population is the semi-
structured interview (Schaner, 2007). The semi-structure interview technique is the verbal 
equivalent of a questionnaire (Fetterman, 1998, p. 38). Thus, while the goals of 
Participant Observation and the Informal Interview are open ended and exploratory, the 
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goal the semi-structure interview is to answer specific research goals (Fetterman, 1998, p. 
38). Information obtained by interviews is compared by the researcher and placed into the 
“context of common group beliefs and themes” (Fetterman, 1998, p. 38).  
Now that we have discussed the purpose of the HTS and highlighted HTT 
research methods, a correlation can be drawn between HTS goals, the theoretical 
framework, and the new direction set forth in the counterinsurgency manual. The 
research methods employed by the HTT are expressly designed to obtain critical 
information of popular behaviors drivers, decisions, perceptions, and preferences. 
Knowing this kind of is critical to pursuing a population-centric approach to COIN. It is 
now appropriate to introduce the broader HTS organizational structure as it is design to 
support HTT research. 
2. Human Terrain System Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of the HTS is designed to provide unique social-
cultural knowledge and expertise not normally associated with the U.S. Army. The HTS 
consists of seven components: (1) Human Terrain Teams; (2) Reachback Research Cells 
(RRC); (3) Subject Matter Expert (SME) network; (4) HTS tool kit (MAP-HT); (5) 
techniques; (6) human terrain information; and (7) specialized training. The following 
paragraphs briefly summarize these pillars and describe the contribution of each pillar to 
the creation and sharing of knowledge. However, because the first and primary pillar (the 
HTT) is such an important and core piece of the HTS concept, a full discussion of the 
HTT is reserved for the next section.  Therefore, we start this discussion with the RRC. 
The Reachback Research Cell (RRC) is the component of the HTS designed to 
support forward deployed HTTs and their host units by conducting detailed analysis of 
data and information collected by HTTs in the field.  RRCs also provide detailed 
responses to Requests for Research (RFR) submitted by HTTs operating in the field.  
RRCs are comprised of former HTT members, cultural experts and highly skilled social 
scientists. The RRC is the principle coordinating agent of the Subject Matter Expert 
Network (SMEnet) (Schaner, 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). 
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This SMEnet represents the third major component of HTS. This network of 
experts is distributed across the United States and includes additional cultural experts and 
social scientists working in academia and the government. Members of this network are 
not obligated to support or deploy with HTTs, but rather contribute on a voluntary basis 
when asked by the RRC. A considerable effort is currently underway to expand this 
network (Schaner, 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). 
The fourth pillar of HTS was introduced earlier as the MAP-HT toolkit. This 
hardware/software solution serves as the central human terrain database, HTT method of 
communication, human terrain visualization and analytical tool. MAP-HT is the primary 
interface through which HTTs communicate with the RRC. When this toolkit is fully 
implemented, it will be the IT solution that captures much of the explicit data, 
information and knowledge collected by HTTs operating in the field. It is the intent of the 
HTS project to distribute the information contained with MAP-HT to other military 
organizations and governments. Thus, MAP-HT is envisioned to be a large repository of 
data, information and explicit knowledge; a tool for analysis; and a mechanism for 
sharing data, information and knowledge across the HTS organization and outside of it  
(Schaner, 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). 
The fifth pillar of the HTS is the technique used by the HTT for creating and 
sharing locally situated knowledge of the population. The technique is commonly 
referred as “denied area ethnography/social science” or “combat ethnography.” The label 
appropriately implies two distinctive features of the tradecraft: (1) the social scientist 
performs his or her duties in previously inaccessible areas (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan), 
and (2) the social scientist is likely to perform his or her research in potentially hostile 
combat environments. In essence, the technique involves applying ethnographic 
tradecraft and research under combat conditions and compressed time cycles. According 
to some experts and critics, this practice is troublesome and faulty. For this reason, the 
practice of “denied area ethnography/social science” is at the core of the HTS 
controversy and is the source of much angst for social scientists. This controversy will be 
addressed in more detail later (Schaner, 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). 
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The sixth pillar of the HTS is the stock of data, information, and knowledge it 
holds about the surrounding population (e.g. information about the roles, goals, 
relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally-relevant group or person). The 
goal of the HTS project is to build knowledge stocks of the population of concern, 
leverage it immediately, retain it for future use, and share it with those who need it – so 
that it may be harnessed by the counterinsurgent to quell conflict, save lives, and defeat 
insurgencies (Schaner, 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). 
The final pillar of the HTS program is specialized training. Currently, at Forth 
Leavenworth Kansas, future HTT members are undergoing rigorous and specialized 
training in preparation for deployment. HTT members are receiving focused training 
related to the area and population to which they will be assigned. Additionally, HTT 
members are trained on the skills of conducting ethnography and social science research. 
Moreover, HTT members without prior military experience receive training on military 
culture and protocols (Schaner 2007; Kipp, Grau, Prinslow & Smith, 2006). 
C. THE HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM 
To round out the introduction and background discussion of the Human Terrain 
System, a more detailed introduction of the Human Terrain Team and its organizational 
structure and method of employment is necessary.  
1. Human Terrain Team Organizational Structure 
Each Human terrain Team consists of a small group of six to nine individuals who 
bring requisite social science and ethnographic skills needed to achieve the HTT research 
and advisory missions. The HTT is tasked with population immersion to obtain explicit 
and tacit knowledge first hand. By getting to know the people on a personal level, HTT 
members are better able to advise their host unit on what actions to take. HTT’s work 
directly for the commanding officer of their host brigade, but each member is free to 
establish links and relationships with other members of the brigade staff. Figure 3 




Figure 3.   Human Terrain Team Organization. 
At the top of the diagram are the Team Leader and Expert Social Scientist. The 
leader’s job is to ensure the commanding officer fully appreciates and integrates the 
capabilities of the HTT into brigade decision making and operations. The Team Leader 
also serves to educate civilian members of the team about the military culture within 
which they are working. This is essential to gaining the team’s acceptance and credibility 
within the brigade. Sharing a position at the top of the HTT organization is the Expert 
Social Scientist. This person is typically a civilian PhD level anthropologist or social 
scientist. Ideally this person has a posteriori knowledge of the population in which he or 
she is immersed. However, when working in denied areas it is difficult to find and recruit 
persons with such expertise. Therefore, the Expert Social Scientist is leveraged for his or 
her research skills and socio-scientific experience. The social scientist is therefore the 
senior person performing integrative analysis that ultimately translates through the team 
leader into advice for the commander and his staff. Additionally, the Expert Social 
Scientist provides guidance and direction to the remaining HTT members. Each 
remaining member of the HTT is an experienced and educated cultural analyst (including 
the research manager) who is language trained and oriented on the area in which they 
become immersed (Schaner, 2007). 
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Because a typical HTT is stacked with capable and even senior people, the 
structure appears appropriate for achieving the HTT’s research and advisory goals. To 
further illustrate the working concept of the HTS by way of its HTTs, a brief overview of 
how HTTs are employed is necessary. 
2. Human Terrain Team Employment 
HTT integration was created to fill an important knowledge and capability gap 
endemic to the U.S. Army. The key to HTT success has been the way in which HTT 
members immerse themselves within the population, develop relationships, perform 
research, and advise the commander. It is integration and immersion that truly highlight 
the potential benefit of the HTS concept (Schaner, 2007). 
To enhance the establishment and maintenance of enduring relationships between 
HTT members and host nation citizens, a unique rotational policy for HTT members has 
been adopted. Unlike an HTT’s host unit (e.g., U.S. Army brigade) that rotates 
periodically, embedded HTTs are designed as permanent fixtures in brigade operating 
areas. Thus, HTT members provide essential continuity for rotating units by maintaining 
local contacts and relationships. The rotational policy of individual HTT members also 
emphasizes continuity. The rotation policy directs that HTT members can only be rotated 
one person at a time. Furthermore, the policy directs a reciprocal rotation that assigns 
returning HTT members to the supporting RRC, and supporting RRC members to the 
supported HTT. This means that individual members continually serve in the same 
HTT/RRC team for as long as the member remains in service. This persistence is 
essential for gaining deeper knowledge and trust of the local population (Schaner, 2007). 
The rotation policy not only enhances continuity for rotating units and fosters 
enduring relationships, but also contributes to the growth of a broader “institutional 
memory.” HTTs and RRCs work together. The information and explicit knowledge 
developed within the broader organization is captured in the MAP-HT toolkit and 
database. This information and knowledge are unclassified and available to just about 
anyone, including the broader HTS organization, and national security decision makers. 
However, there is no policy or doctrine that requires national security decision makers to 
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observe or consider the kind of knowledge being produced by the HTS. In fact, the 
designers of the HTS frequently refer to the development process as “building a plane in 
flight.” This analogy highlights a problem that while buy-in from the top has been 
achieved (e.g., Secretary of Defense support, and Department of Defense funding), no 
overarching and coordinated strategy from the top is driving project development or 
implementation. This condition has implications for the projects development in so far 
that it has contributed to breeding controversy and opposition (Schaner, 2007a). 
D. OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS TO THE HTS PROJECT 
In addition to the academic controversy associated with the HTS project, it is 
important to introduce two forms of opposition in more detail. The first form of 
opposition comes from the social sciences community. Organizations like the Network of 
Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) are strongly opposed to the notion of anthropologists 
supporting counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, there exists opposition for the 
project among government planners and analysts. Much of this opposition stems from a 
belief that available resources could be better used and that new projects like the HTS are 
largely unnecessary or insufficient.  
1. Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) 
Strong and organized opposition exhibited by the social science communities such 
as the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) may significantly impact future 
HTS recruiting efforts. Moreover, gross misunderstandings of the meaning of “human 
terrain” among military planners and a general lack of strategic coordination from the top 
have delivered opposition groups fertile material supporting their cause. For instance, the 
Department of Defense recently released a document entitled “Precision Engagement – 
Strategic Context for the Long War.”  This document briefly discusses the “need to Map 
the Human Terrain” to “[enable] the entire Kill Chain for the GWOT.”  However, the 
brief continues without ever mentioning the HTS project or any other capability for 
mapping the human terrain. Instead it advocates for the development of futuristic 
technologies that provide persistent observation of the battlefield. This document clearly 
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reflects a fundamentally conventional theory of victory in war that contradicts winning 
through the population, and fundamentally contradicts the purpose of the HTS. To make 
matters worse for the HTS project, the NCA promotes a link on its website directly to this 
brief and is therefore being used to drum up more opposition (Vine, 2007, p. B9). 
The Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) has leveraged their 1998 
Code of Ethics to establish the basis for opposition. Through this code, the NCA charges 
that HTT members three ethical violations: (1) anthropologists providing direct assistance 
to military personnel who use this assistance kill other human beings violate the 
anthropological code of ethics; (2) anthropologists working with military forces are likely 
to obscure the true nature of their work and thus violate the anthropological codes of 
ethics; and (3) anthropologists providing direct assistance to military operations are likely 
to cultivate a perception that other anthropologists worldwide are not objective and 
trustworthy, but are “agents” of the U.S. government and military (Vine, 2007, p. B9). 
The NCA promulgates and actively recruits opponents to the Human Terrain 
System. More specifically, they urge anthropology graduates and professionals to sign a 
petition that renounces the HTS project, and pledges their non-participation. The 
following is an excerpt from the NCA Pledge of Non-participation in Counter-insurgency 
that highlights the root of the group’s opposition:  
While often presented by its proponents as work that builds a more secure 
world, protects US soldiers on the battlefield, or promotes cross-cultural 
understanding, at base [the HTS] contributes instead to a brutal war of 
occupation which has entailed massive casualties. By so doing, such work 
breaches relations of openness and trust with the people anthropologists 
work with around the world and, directly or indirectly, enables the 
occupation of one country by another. In addition, much of this work is 
covert. Anthropological support for such an enterprise is at odds with the 
humane ideals of our discipline as well as professional standards. (excerpt 




2. Opposition from Military Thinkers 
In addition to opposition groups outside of the government, there are some circles 
of thought within the government that represent to a lesser degree a form of opposition to 
the HTS project. For instance, some military thinkers strongly believe the HTS concept is 
insufficient. Instead they support developing an entirely new social science career track 
and a supporting agency within the U.S. military. They advocate for the development of a 
professional military person who is highly educated and trained within the social sciences 
and who is immersed long term into a population of interest (Schaner, 2008). 
For those promoting this idea, the concept of HTS is insufficient and incapable of 
revealing the kind of knowledge needed by the counterinsurgent to win the population 
and displace the insurgency. They argue that the long term solution to the myriad 
unconventional conflicts facing the United States now and in the foreseeable future 
hinges on the ability to deeply penetrate foreign societies and social networks prior to 
conflict. The career ethnographer provides the instrument and capability for achieving 
this level of immersion. To cultivate a deep level of knowledge, this ethnographer would 
dedicate his entire career to studying one particular group or region. The logic continues 
that having such deep knowledge will give the U.S. military a significant advantage and 
necessary resolution to uncover “indigenous means of mobilization, organization, and 










III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Chapter III discusses the research method used to examine the Human Terrain 
System in the COIN and nation building contexts. More specifically, the research method 
used examines the knowledge flow dynamics associated with the focal Human Terrain 
Team (known as IZ6), its host brigade, the Human Terrain System (HTS), and the 
population. Leveraging Yin (1994), the research follows the single-case study method 
and employs the theoretical frameworks above to guide the analysis. This chapter 
provides a blueprint for the analysis and describes a systematic process for repeated 
qualitative data collection and evaluation. The chapter is divided into three sections to 
discuss why the case study method is used for this investigation, the type of data 
collected, and the qualitative analytical approach used to inform results.  
A. THE SINGLE-CASE STUDY OF AN EXTREME ORGANIZATION 
Yin (1994) establishes rationale for conducting single-case designs. He discusses 
the unique or extreme case as one in which the unit of analysis represents a rare or new 
instance or phenomenon. Additionally, Yin associates the appropriateness of a single-
case study with the need to test a significant theory. Analyzing the Human Terrain Team 
satisfies both of these requirements. Given that embedding HTTs into Army brigades 
represents a dramatic shift in counterinsurgency practice, is controversial, and is a new 
and recent phenomenon, the unit of analysis appears to lend itself to the single-case 
design. Furthermore, because the Human Terrain Team concept enables Army brigades 
to focus better on the population, a significant theory emerges to be tested. If the Human 
Terrain Team concept yields a significant competitive advantage to the counterinsurgent 
(i.e., the host unit), then we may draw inferences about the unconventional theory of 
victory in war as it relates to counterinsurgency and nation building operations. As noted 
above, this theory represents a fundamentally opposite approach for organizing, training, 




The single-case study method is used in the research to guide the investigation. 
More specifically, the single-case study method is leveraged to bridge the theoretical 
framework and the data collected through logical evaluation. The evaluation includes a 
visualization of dynamic knowledge flows through and between the focal Human Terrain 
Team, its host unit, the population, and the Human Terrain System. Thus, the analysis 
represents a single-case from a holistic viewpoint (Yin, 1994, p. 39). This approach 
enables the research to observe rich dynamic knowledge flows within and around the 
focal organization, and provides a way of identifying processes that yield a knowledge-
based competitive advantage. Using the case study interpretive method, the research 
focuses qualitatively on the research questions (i.e, how do enhanced population-centric 
HTT knowledge flows contribute to BCT competitive advantage? And, how does the 
focal organization advance a population-centric strategy?) (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 
1987, p. 368-386). These kinds of research questions appear well suited for qualitative 
analysis and inappropriate for positivist or quantitative analytical methods (Klein & 
Myers, 1999, p. 67-94).  
Moreover, the case study method ensures an acceptable process for research and 
provides the basis for repeated analysis in the future. Repeated iterations of data 
collection and analysis are crucial following this research to help ground the theory in the 
data (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532-550), and to help focus future research on evolving the 
unconventional theory of victory in war – even if it appears as “common sense” to most 
practitioners and strategists (Glaser, 1967). Finally, the single-case study method appears 
appropriate for this analysis because it begins by examining the basis of competitive 
advantage as predicted by Knowledge-Flow Theory, and because it attempts to ground 
this advantage in unconventional warfare theory. Thus, the research is more explanatory 
than descriptive (Yin, 1994, p. 6).  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection techniques used for the research include: (1) document review, 
and (2) interview. Briefly, documents provide important background information about 
an organization’s mission, jobs, work processes, people, and technologies (Nissen, 2007, 
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p. 235). Additionally, documents provide important contextual information surrounding 
the HTS organization such as supporting theories, organizational issues, opposition 
movements, and controversies surrounding the HTS initiative (Nissen, 2007). Moreover, 
documents related to current counterinsurgency operations and strategies provide 
significant insight on aspects across the domain of analysis. Finally, reviewing 
documents also helps in the formulation of interview questions. The research is benefited 
by the researcher’s continued access to HTS and HTT documents during the study. Thus, 
document review is a continual and essential process throughout the research. 
Concurrent with the document review process, interviews are conducted with 
participants directly involved in the design and implementation of the Human Terrain 
System and Human Terrain Teams. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with 
probing and snowballing techniques (Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Nelson, Nadkarni, 
Narayanan, & Ghods, 2000, p. 475-507; Reich & Kaarst-Brown, 1999, p. 337-364). 
Briefly, the probing technique involves asking the interviewee additional questions that 
arise from previous interviewee responses. This enables the researcher to probe more 
deeply into important themes that emerge from the interview process. As the researcher 
gathers more detailed information from the interviewee, the snowballing technique is 
used to collect this information and add it to the body of research cumulatively. 
Information solicited from organizational architects, leaders, and participants 
provides essential experiential insight that enhances the information provided by 
documents. Table 1 summarizes the sample frame. Each participant interviewed is a 
founding or participating member of the Human Terrain System organization or a 
deployed HTT. Thus, each interviewee possesses deep experiential knowledge of the 
project and organization. Moreover, the principal interviewee is the lead Social Scientist 








Project Manager HTS 
Director, Research Reachback Center HTS 
Senior Social Scientist HTS 
Cultural Analyst 1 RRC 
Cultural Analyst 2 RRC 
Director, Human Resource Development HTS 
Lead Social Scientist Focal HTT 
Table 1.   List of Interviews. 
The interview sample conducted during the research spans the HTS organization’s 
functional areas and levels. The participants reflect expertise across a broad range of jobs, 
and knowledge domains. All interviews of senior HTS personnel are semi-structured and 
occur over a two day period at a unique gathering of all HTS leaders, developers, and 
participants at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in November 2007. Interviews with the lead 
Social Scientist of the focal organization occur daily via email over a four week period in 
July and August 2008. Data collected from senior HTS personnel contribute to the 
contextual and background discussions in Chapters I and II. Data collected from the lead 
Social Scientist of the focal organization serves as the basis of analysis in Chapter IV. 
This data revolves around three narrative accounts that illustrate HTT operations in 
support of the host unit. The Researcher is privileged with continued access to most of 
the participants, including the lead Social Scientist of the focal HTT. This enables the 
Investigator to clarify issues, probe more deeply into concepts, and to verify facts. 
Chapter V conclusions and recommendations are based on the synthesis of Chapter IV 
results and the background discussions in Chapters I and II.  
C. EXPLANATION-BUILDING CASE STUDY STRATEGY 
The research method uses the Explanation-Building case study process (Yin, 
1994, p. 110). The method is tailored to examine the data collected, draw inferences 
grounded in the theoretical framework, and generalize the obtained inferences to build 
themes that can inform future HTS design. More specifically, the inferences drawn 
represent stipulations of causal links between enhanced knowledge flows and competitive 
 45
advantage. Establishing the basis of competitive advantage through knowledge flow 
analysis helps to explain the research questions and reinforce the foundational theoretical 
premise of the research – that an unconventional (population centric) approach to COIN 
and nation building is a superior approach. Because the Explanation-Building case study 
strategy requires iteration (Yin, 1994, p. 111), this thesis can only represent an essential 
first step. The basis of this case study analysis as the first iteration requires a focus on one 
of the first post proof-of-concept HTT deployments – IZ6 in Iraq. At the time of this 
writing (September, 2008), there are sixteen HTTs deployed in total across Iraq and 
Afghanistan. These and future deployments provide ample opportunity for follow on 
research and comparative case analysis.   
The case strategy in this research defines a basic three step process. The first step 
begins with analyzing the collected data (IZ6 narrative accounts) through a 
multidimensional knowledge flow visualization technique drawn from Nonaka (1994) 
and Nissen (2006). The second step uses the interpretive method to draw inferences from 
the knowledge flow visualization. Inferences drawn from interpreting knowledge flows 
are used to identify sources of competitive advantage as well as knowledge flow 
pathologies. The final step of the analytical process identifies themes grounded in the 
theoretical framework that can inform HTS design and COIN strategy.  
The first two steps of the analytical process (knowledge flow visualization, and 
inference determination) are repeated for each narrative account. The third step (theme 
development) is completed at the end after the three narrative accounts have been 
analyzed. The remainder of this section discusses in detail the three steps comprising the 
analytic method.   
1. Visualizing Knowledge Flows Multidimensionally 
Step 1 of the research method is repeated three times – once for each narrative 
account. The step involves analyzing the collected data multidimensionally by 
graphically displaying knowledge flows pulled from the narrative. This technique is 
introduced in Chapter II and is expanded upon here. The technique holistically identifies 
knowledge flows associated with the narrative account to illustrate how knowledge is 
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created, shared, and harnessed across interacting organizations and people. Moreover, the 
technique involves visualizing knowledge flows graphically across four dimensions: 
explicitness, reach, flow time, and knowledge flow life cycle. This display is used to 
literally see how knowledge moves and transforms. The display also is used to help the 
reader make sense of how the studied organization generates a knowledge based 
competitive advantage.  
Step 1 begins with a summary of the written narrative account provided by the 
lead Social Scientist of IZ6. From the narrative account, critical knowledge flows are 
identified and described. Next, the critical knowledge flows are converted into vectors 
and are placed into the visualization diagram to depict how the knowledge is created, 
shared, and harnessed across organizations and people. Finally, each knowledge flow 
vector is described in detail in relation to the four dimensions identified above. This 
description explains how new knowledge of the population is first created, and then 
shared with and harnessed by the focal organization. This description is necessary for 
inferring competitive advantages and pathologies.  
2. Inferring Competitive Advantage and Pathology 
Step 2 involves interpreting the knowledge flows revealed and described in step 1. 
Step 2 begins by examining the narrative account and associated knowledge flow analysis 
against the backdrop of the thesis context, theoretical framework, and the host unit’s 
mission and strategy. The interpretation draws from Nissen 2006 to look for evidence that 
a particular knowledge flow contributes to improving the host unit’s competitive 
potential. For instance, if a knowledge flow can be reasonably shown to grow the 
supported unit’s knowledge stock, then an inference can be drawn (consistent with 
Knowledge Flow Theory) that the supported unit’s competitive potential increases.  In 
this way, the inferences of step 2 relate the knowledge flow analysis to the theoretical 
framework.  
In a similar way, inferences are drawn to identify potential sources of knowledge 
flow pathology. For instance, if a knowledge flow vector or set of circumstances can be 
reasonably deduced to inhibit social interaction, feedback, or learning, then a specific 
 47
pathology is revealed consistent with the theoretical framework. This process is repeated 
for all iterations of knowledge flow visualization and for selected knowledge flow 
descriptions. Step 2 provides the necessary inputs for generalizing themes. 
3. Generalizing Themes 
The final step of the qualitative analysis involves generalizing the output from 
step 2 into themes that can inform HTS design and COIN strategy. This requires 
identifying patterns that emerge from steps 1 and 2 and examining them within the thesis 
context, framework, and unit mission. The generalized analysis of knowledge flows and 
the identification of themes, such as sources of competitive advantage and pathology, 
helps identify items for consideration and informs the conclusions and recommendations 
of Chapter V.  
For instance, if the analysis reveals a systemic pathology that inhibits 
socialization or the growth of unit knowledge stocks over time, then various aspects of 
overall HTS/HTT design may be drawn into question. On the contrary, if the analysis 
reveals a systemic source of competitive advantage, then various aspects of the overall 
HTS/HTT design may be validated. In either case, the analysis informs HTS/HTT design 
and subsequently counterinsurgency strategy.  
In closing, Chapter III provides a blueprint for analyzing the Human Terrain 
System. More specifically, the research method described above focuses on leveraging 
existing theory and proven research techniques to examine an extreme organization and 
identify sources of competitive advantage or pathology. This chapter provides a basis for 
a repeatable and systematic process for collecting and evaluating qualitative data of a 
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IV. RESEARCH RESULTS 
The Human Terrain System as a whole is a complex knowledge-based 
organization that creates and harnesses competitive enabling explicit and tacit knowledge 
flows. The principle HTS component for creating and sharing competitive enabling 
knowledge is the Human Terrain Team (HTT). This chapter analyzes the activities of one 
currently deployed Human Terrain Team named IZ6. The results focus on how IZ6 
creates, shares, and leverages knowledge of the population to enhance the performance of 
its supported unit – 2nd Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored Division (2BCT/1AD). This 
chapter begins with a contextual discussion of IZ6 that includes a description of 
2BCT/1AD, the environment, and the HTT’s organization, roles, and personnel. 
Following this discussion, a detailed knowledge flow analysis of the team is performed 
based on three descriptive narrative accounts provided by IZ6 participants. Included 
within the analysis are discussions of how the team created and shared valuable 
knowledge that enhanced 2BCT/1AD’s competitive potential. Also included in the 
knowledge flow analysis are discussions of potential knowledge flow pathologies. 
Graphical techniques are used to visualize knowledge flows to help the reader 
conceptualize the movement and transformation of knowledge in a way consistent with 
Knowledge Flow Theory. The chapter concludes by identifying themes drawn from the 
Knowledge Flow Analysis. These themes establish the basis for Chapter V conclusions 
and recommendations. 
A.  CONTEXT 
IZ6 is operationally attached to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored 
Division (2BCT/1AD). The HTT supports BCT operations across a large rural 
geographical area to the south and east of Baghdad, Iraq, called Operational Environment 
(OE) Striker. OE Striker comprises a physical area about four times the size of Baghdad 
City. Subordinate units of 2BCT/1AD are distributed across OE Striker and are assigned 
sub areas of responsibility that together comprise the whole of OE Striker. Each 
subordinate unit is called a Task Force (TF), another name for a battalion. The call sign 
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for each TF correlates with the name of each TF’s subordinate OE. For instance, TF 2-6, 
known as “Iron Gator” operates within its subordinate OE named “Gator”. 2BCT is the 
headquarters echelon to four maneuver TFs and two support TFs. The remaining three 
maneuver TFs are: TF 1-6/ “Iron Regulars”, TF 1-35/ “Iron Knights”, and TF 4-27/ “Iron 
Thunder”. The support TFs, (TF 40 and TF 47) operate across OE boundaries and 
provide engineering and logistics support to the maneuver TFs. Currently TF 1-6 is under 
operational control of a different division and has been replaced by the 13th Georgian 
Battalion/TF Petro (Schaner, 2008d). 
In addition to each Task Force, a Civil Affairs Battalion (CA BN) and an 
embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) are assigned to support 2BCT/1AD. 
The CA BN deploys teams to support each of the maneuver TFs within their assigned 
subordinate OE. The CA BN, like the HTT, is on staggered rotational policy designed to 
enhance knowledge and civil-military relationship continuity during periods of scheduled 
turnover. The embedded ePRT is deployed by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and 
exists within the BCT’s purview to help coordinate development efforts within the OE. 
Thus, a cooperative and mutually supporting relationship exists between the ePRT and 
the BCT. This relationship is centered on developing and implementing a Joint Common 
Plan (JCP) for non-lethal initiatives (e.g., reconstruction, revitalization, and development) 
within the OE (Schaner, 2008d). 
OE Striker is comparatively stable at the time of this writing (September 2008). 
The OE is over 70% rural, containing only four population centers of note: Salman Pak, 
Jisr Diyala, Waheda, and Nahrawan. The remainder of the OE is very rural and has only 
small villages and settlements. The climate, geography, and sparse population 
distribution make OE Striker an ideal area for agricultural development and 
revitalization. Thus, reconstruction and economic development efforts in OE Striker 
emphasize developing agricultural capabilities, fisheries, and supporting infrastructure. 
2BCT/1AD is responsible for working with the Government of Iraq (GoI), Iraqi Defense 
Forces (IDF), and other U.S. Government agencies such as the U.S. Department of State 
and U.S. Department of Agriculture, to develop economic opportunity in OE Striker. In 
addition to developing economic opportunity, 2BCT/1AD is responsible for performing 
 51
other missions such as counterinsurgency, population security, and reconstruction. IZ6 
supports 2BCT/1AD efforts in all of its non-lethal missions by providing research support 
focused on the population and its needs (Schaner, 2008d). 
IZ6 comprises six members all of whom have significant experience in various 
domains. The Field Social Scientist (SS), who is senior social scientist responsible for 
HTT research, has earned a joint PhD in political science and criminology, a master’s 
degree in comparative religion, a master’s degree in international security, and a 
bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies. He is well published in areas such as 
religious and identity terrorism, political violence, politics, comparative security, and 
security administration. He has also consulted with many organizations on terrorism, 
counter-terrorism, and security administration. Working with the Field Social Scientist 
are two Research Managers, both Army retirees. One Research Manager is a 22 year 
veteran of the Special Forces with extensive experience in counterinsurgency, and the 
other is a 24 year Chief Warrant Officer with criminal investigative experience. The 
military Team Leader is an Army Reserve Captain with an undergraduate degree in 
Anthropology. One of the Research Analysts served in the Army during Vietnam as a 
medic and specializes in social/psychological counseling. He has an additional 
background in business management and education. Finally, the last Research Analyst 
has a master’s degree in security administration and bachelor’s degree in political science 
and criminology (Schaner, 2008d). 
Collectively, IZ6 is a team with vast amounts of education and experience both in 
and outside the military. Together, they bring diverse knowledge sets and worldviews to 
the HTT and BCT. IZ6 members have established excellent working relationships with 
the BCT leadership and staff. The lead Social Scientist and members of IZ6 frequently 
meet face to face with many different BCT staff members who perform various 
leadership and planning functions within the Brigade. Interactions between IZ6 members 
and BCT staff members are both formal and informal. Formal meetings and briefings 
designed to exchange knowledge, promulgate mission requirements, improve situational 
awareness, develop plans, disseminate research findings, and identify knowledge gaps 
occur daily. Likewise, frequent interaction and exchanges between IZ6 members and 
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BCT staff occur also over meals and other informal or spontaneous settings. Additionally, 
IZ6 members frequently meet face to face, or communicate electronically or 
telephonically with Civil Affairs (CA) teams, ePRT members, RRC members, and local 
civilian leaders and contractors (Schaner, 2008d). 
Within this apparently fertile knowledge flow environment, IZ6 members are 
actively involved in supporting ePRT/BCT population-centric non-kinetic activities. For 
instance, IZ6 members help identify potentially high-payoff revitalization projects and 
potentially effective local civilian contractors to perform work. Hiring locals to perform 
improvement projects is an essential component of reconstruction. It helps establish 
connections between local civilians and military personnel, empower local leaders, 
alienate insurgents, restore services, and ultimately compel the population’s support 
(Schaner, 2008d). 
In addition to identifying important projects and reliable contractors, IZ6 
members frequently employ their knowledge of the population by role playing the 
population and its viewpoints during ePRT/BCT planning sessions. For instance, in a 
reconstruction/contracting scenario, IZ6 role plays the population to help the ePRT/BCT 
better predict potential outcomes, and identify risks associated with candidate courses of 
action (COAs). In a general sense, role playing the population raises the BCT’s 
competitive potential by enabling BCT planners to better understand the human aspects 
of the operational environment within which they are working. In this case, knowing 
what is important to Iraqis and learning how to employ local workers within their local 
tribal structure and cultural framework represents an important human dimension. In 
addition to role playing, the HTT disseminates various contextual information and 
knowledge products pertaining to the population. For instance, IZ6 has prepared several 
cultural, historical, religious, and communications presentations, and disseminated them 
via electronic posting on the BCT’s intranet portal (Schaner, 2008d). 
Another important service IZ6 performs is identifying and filling specific BCT 
knowledge gaps of the population. For instance, IZ6 research helps reveal the perceptions 
and attitudes of local leaders and civilians. The HTT accomplishes this by performing 
social science research across OE Striker and by using techniques such as participant 
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observation and extended unstructured interviews. To aid in their research, team 
members also incorporate knowledge obtained from BCT documents, RRC research 
request responses, coalition documents, government documents, and open sources to 
contextualize and enhance their research (Schaner, 2008d). 
As noted above, IZ6 works frequently with Civil Affairs (CA) teams located 
within each subordinate TF. They in fact share a close relationship that appears a natural 
and necessary fit because of the dispersed nature of the OE and the single point location 
of the HTT. IZ6 is co-located with 2BCT/1AD headquarters; the CA teams are embedded 
within each maneuver TF and therefore provide IZ6 with access and escort into the 
population. This enables IZ6 to establish its own connections and relationships within the 
population. However, due to limited means of transportation available to IZ6, and the 
dispersed nature of OE Striker, IZ6 can only periodically revisit members of the 
population spread across the OE. The CA teams provide a much more persistent presence 
within the population and therefore emerge as an important information and knowledge 
conduit for IZ6 and the BCT (Schaner, 2008d). 
B. KNOWLEDGE FLOW ANALYSIS 
This section contains the analytical results of three separate narrative accounts 
provided by IZ6 as they relate to the team’s knowledge contribution in support of 2BCT’s 
operations in OE Striker. The first narrative account centers on IZ6’s contribution toward 
enhancing ePRT/BCT agricultural development initiatives within OE Striker. The second 
narrative account highlights IZ6’s contribution toward revealing the sentiment that may 
not otherwise be obvious. The third narrative account describes how IZ6 conducts open 
source research to hedge predicted problems associated with Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs).  
1. Narrative Account # 1: Agricultural Enhancement 
Because the physical environment of OE Striker is conducive to and has a long 
history of agriculture and fish farming, developing plans to provide economic opportunity 
by way of these themes is a primary focus of the ePRT and 2BCT. Revitalization efforts 
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and projects for OE Striker are codified in the Joint Common Plan (JCP). The JCP lays 
out non-lethal priorities and objectives (such as reconstruction projects) within the OE. It 
is developed through joint a planning process between the ePRT and the BCT. In this first 
narrative account, IZ6 plays an instrumental role in identifying important revitalization 
opportunities within OE Striker by validating certain assumptions about the water supply, 
by learning how agriculture and fish farming used to work within the OE, and by learning 
how the people believe these industries can work again. Additionally, IZ6 helped identify 
local contractors to work on this agricultural revitalization effort (Schaner, 2008d). 
These four pieces of knowledge (i.e., validated assumptions, how the industries 
used to work, how the people believe they can work again, and which contractors to hire) 
were created by IZ6 as the lead Social Scientist and a Human Terrain Analyst conducted 
observations and unstructured interviews with local citizens. To conduct his observations 
and interviews, the lead Social Scientist, accompanied by a CA team, spent time with 
various subordinate units in their areas of responsibility. During this time, the lead Social 
Scientist met with locals and discussed with them issues about agriculture and fish 
farming. In one instance, the lead Social Scientist interviewed a local fish farmer for 
about an hour. During this interview the local citizen revealed much about the water 
supply as it relates to agriculture and fish farming. The local citizen helped validate 
certain assumptions about whether the water supply could support either or both 
industries (Schaner, 2008d). 
The local citizen also provided much information about how both industries used 
to work within the OE. He provided detailed information about what worked well, and 
what didn’t, and he offered suggestions on how to get these industries back up and 
running. Additionally, the local fish farmer provided his assessment on what he believed 
the market could and could not withstand if the economy was revitalized on this basis of 
these industries. This kind of qualitative knowledge was prized by the ePRT/BCT upon 
its synthesis and reporting and was quickly utilized by the ePRT/BCT to develop plans 
for improving the water infrastructure within the OE (Schaner, 2008d). 
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a. Visual Knowledge Flow Analysis 
Evaluating this narrative account from a knowledge flow perspective, we 
recognize that knowledge is clearly important in developing economic revitalization 
plans, and hiring local contractors to perform the work. Validating assumptions and 
developing knowledge of how a local economy used to work is important for determining 
what might work in the future. Moreover, knowing the local culture and tribal structure is 
important for hiring local contractors. Figure 4 graphically depicts how newly created 
knowledge moved and transformed in this instance and how it contributed toward 
implementing the ePRT/BCT’s economic revitalization plan.  
 
Figure 4.   Economic Revitalization Knowledge Flow Visualization Diagram. 
Examining Figure 4 more closely, we see that point A represents the HTT 
as it obtains a tacit understanding of the environment (physical, social, and structural) 
with respect to economic revitalization opportunities and needs. Much knowledge is in 
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motion prior to arriving at point A that is worth mentioning but is outside the focus of 
this diagram. For instance, prior to engaging the population through observation and 
interviews, IZ6 obtained general contextual information from the RRC, BCT documents, 
and open sources with respect to OE Striker’s physical, social, tribal composition. 
Moreover, IZ6 obtained contextual information about OE Striker’s agricultural potential 
and pre-existing infrastructure. Combining this contextual information with general 
knowledge derived from years of social science experience, IZ6 engaged the population 
with a substantial initial knowledge base. Thus, additional observations and first hand 
accounts pulled from the population were quickly internalized and combined with 
contextual information to develop a sound and tacit understanding of the opportunities 
and requirements for economic revitalization. Thus, point A represents IZ6’s tacit view of 
how economic revitalization should occur.  
Communicating this knowledge to the BCT is the task of the HTT. 
Knowledge flow vectors (A to B) and (A to B¹) represent the flow of knowledge across 
the reach dimension as it is shared with the ePRT/BCT staff. Knowledge flow vector (A 
to B) represents a socialization flow of tacit knowledge characterized by repeated 
informal and formal discussions, storytelling, and face to face interactions between IZ6 
members and the ePRT/BCT staff members over time. The knowledge flowing along 
vector (A to B¹) represents the direct reporting of field notes via written, electronic, or 
verbal means with the ePRT/BCT staff. Explicit knowledge moving along this vector 
includes such things as what projects should be undertaken and where they should take 
place.  
Observing the knowledge flow vectors (B to C) and (B¹ to C), we see the 
ePRT/BCT staff make explicit its tacit understanding of economic revitalization 
opportunities and requirements (physical, cultural, and tribal), and incorporate specific 
recommendations provided by the HTT. These flows occurs within the reach dimension 
of ePRT/BCT staff, but moves to the formalize life cycle stage as plans are written.  
Observing vector (C to D), we see the ePRT’s agricultural revitalization 
plan manifest in orders and taskings which are disseminated to subordinate units for 
action. Because this flow occurs across the broader BCT organization, it is best depicted 
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at the BCT reach dimension and the organize dimension of the life cycle. Vector (C to D) 
is best described as a combination flow because subordinate units must recontextualize 
explicit knowledge of the local environment with new explicit knowledge contained 
within their orders to support the revitalization plan.   
The (D to E) vector represents a BCT internalization flow associated with 
implementing assigned tasks within the cultural and social context. In this case, the BCT 
hired local contractors to dig wells in various locations around OE Striker. These wells 
were identified as crucial in revitalizing a supporting agricultural infrastructure. The (D 
to E) vector is represented by a thick (tacit) line because it involves the transformation of 
explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge. For instance, in this case, workflow processes 
(e.g., contract, supervise, and support the digging of wells) were initiated by written 
order. During the process, BCT workers applied their generic (explicit) knowledge of the 
contracting process, but now within a specific social, cultural, and linguistic context. 
Finally, we return to knowledge flow vector (A to B), (A to B¹) and 
observe knowledge flow vectors (E to B) and (E to B¹). These vectors represent a 
feedback loop. Over time, as the HTT and BCT members engage local civilians, team 
and military members will provide feedback about the project’s effectiveness. This 
knowledge is shared through informal and formal socialization (tacit knowledge flow 
vector (A to B) and (E to B)), and through written formal assessments and after action 
reports (explicit knowledge flow vectors (A to B¹), (E to B¹)). This completes the 
knowledge flow loop and defines it as an iterative learning-doing process that 
continuously improves performance and increases overall knowledge stocks across the 
organization over time.  
b. IZ6 Contribution Toward ePRT/BCT Competitive Advantage 
This first narrative account yields two observations that indicate IZ6’s 
contribution toward improving the BCT’s competitive potential. First, IZ6 enables the 
BCT to bridge into the population by first helping to identify potential high-payoff 
revitalization opportunities, and then by helping to identify local civilians to hire. These 
activities increase the amount of interaction occurring between the BCT and the civilian 
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population. Moreover, this kind of interaction is positive because it creates infrastructure 
necessary for economic revitalization. Increasing social interaction and establishing or 
restoring essential services is identified in the Army and Marine Corps COIN manual as 
critical to winning the population’s support (U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual, 2007, p. 169). 
Second, the iterative process defined in Figure 4 demonstrates how 
knowledge accumulates over time. The feedback loop discussed in the figure provides 
new knowledge about the effectiveness of previous or ongoing projects to be 
incorporated into ePRT/BCT planning efforts. Knowledge flow vectors (A to B), (A to 
B¹) and (E to B) and (E to B¹) are in essence the avenue for lessons learned and thus 
represent the process for increasing the BCT’s overall knowledge base over time. An 
accumulating knowledge stock over time improves organizational performance over time 
(Nissen, 2006, p. 81). This, in practice as well as theory, indicates a cumulatively 
improving competitive potential.  
c. Potential Knowledge Flow Pathologies 
The feedback loop defined in Figure 4 establishes lessons learned as a 
critical component toward growing the BCT’s overall knowledge stock and improving its 
competitive potential over time. Thus, if no process exists at the BCT to refine plans 
according to feedback, then the feedback vectors in Figure 4 would be nullified. 
Therefore, a potential knowledge flow pathology could exist or emerge if the BCT does 
not emphasize obtaining feedback and applying lessons learned from reconstruction 
projects.  
2. Narrative Account #2: Popular Perceptions of the People 
The second narrative account provided by IZ6, illustrates how the team enhances 
the BCT’s understanding of popular perceptions and behavior. Knowing how local tribal 
leaders and citizens perceive their environment and U.S. forces is crucially important to 
all facets of BCT operations that relate to the population (e.g., security, 
counterinsurgency, and reconstruction).  In this second scenario, IZ6 greatly contributed 
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to enhancing awareness and insight into the truth about what a senior local Shia tribal 
Sheikh actually believed versus what he conveyed to his American associates. Given that 
this particular tribal Sheikh is a senior leader in his community, such beliefs most likely 
reflect the sentiment of his constituents (Schaner, 2008d). 
This narrative describes the IZ6 lead Social Scientist participating in a 
municipality development conference in a subordinate OE. During one of the conference 
sessions a senior Shia tribal Sheikh started shouting and was subsequently escorted out 
by a senior Sunni tribal Sheikh. A translator explained to the IZ6 Team Leader that the 
tribal Sheikh was shouting about how things are never done right, never completed, and 
how things are never improved. However, the tribal Sheikh’s comments in front of his 
peers directly contradicted what the Social Scientist heard the tribal Sheikh say to his 
American associates in a different forum (Schaner, 2008d). 
An Iraqi conference participant revealed that the tribal Sheik’s apparently 
contradictory behavior had root in a great amount of confusion that exists among Iraqis 
over what America is trying to accomplish in Iraq. The Iraqi conference participant 
elaborated on this reasoning by further explaining that most Iraqis do not understand how 
a nation like the United States could invade a country like Iraq, and then turn around and 
rebuild it. In the eyes of Iraqis and in Iraqi culture, these are two contradictory and 
confusing endeavors that generate mistrust and confusion, and sit at the root of the tribal 
Sheikh’s contradictory behavior (Schaner, 2008d). 
a. Visual Knowledge Flow Analysis 
Evaluating this narrative account from a knowledge flow perspective, we 
recognize the importance of needing to know the real perceptions and attitudes of Iraqi 
leaders and citizens. Knowing this can significantly enhance the ability of American 
forces 2BCT to develop more effective engagement and development strategies, and thus 
enhance BCT performance. This narrative account represents a unique instance in which 
the HTT Team Leader observed a candid outburst of a prominent Shia tribal leader in a 
setting with no American military leaders present. Prior to this instance, much of the 
HTT’s knowledge of local perceptions was based on observing meetings between Iraqi 
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leaders and BCT or TF leaders, or through interviews with local citizens and leaders. 
Figure 5 graphically depicts how new knowledge of popular perceptions move and 
transform to increase the BCT’s awareness and improve operational effectiveness. 
 
Figure 5.   Popular Perceptions Knowledge Flow Visualization Diagram. 
Examining Figure 5 more closely, we see that point A represents the HTT 
as it updates its tacit understanding of local popular perceptions with new observations. 
This is an example of knowledge in motion prior to arriving at point A that is worth 
mentioning but is outside the focus of this diagram. For instance, prior to observing this 
incident with few Americans present, the HTT possessed an understanding of popular 
perceptions based on previously observed military-civil interactions within the OE. This 
incident was somewhat startling and indicated that perhaps Iraq-American relationships 
still needed improvement with respect this segment of society. This new and potentially 
revealing observation provided new insights that helped refine the HTT’s tacit 
understanding of popular perceptions and behaviors – an understanding represented by 
point A. 
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Communicating this knowledge to the BCT is the task of the HTT. 
Knowledge flow vectors (A to B) and (A to B¹) represent the flow of knowledge across 
the reach dimension as the HTT shares it with the BCT staff. Knowledge flow vector (A 
to B) represents the socialization of tacit knowledge through informal and formal 
discussions, story telling, and face to face interactions. The knowledge flowing along 
vector (A to B¹) represents the one time reporting of this unusual incident through field 
notes and verbal communications with the BCT staff. Although we have made some 
assumptions to fill in missing details, the knowledge-flow diagram and following 
discussions are consistent with and representative of similar actions and observations. 
Observing knowledge flow vectors (B to C) we see the BCT staff make 
explicit its understanding of popular perceptions as they relate to all BCT functions and 
interactions that involve the civilian population. Vector (B¹ to C) represents the 
incorporation of the HTT report of this incident with other BCT assessments of popular 
attitudes. Both of these flows occur within the reach dimension of BCT staff, but move to 
the formalize life cycle stage as new assessments are written to inform BCT member 
interaction with the population.  
Observing vector (C to D) we see the new BCT assessment disseminated 
to subordinate units. Because this flow occurs across the broader BCT organization, it is 
best depicted at the BCT reach dimension and the organize dimension of the life cycle. 
Vector (C to D) is best described as a combination flow because subordinate units must 
recontextualize prior knowledge of the local population with new explicit knowledge 
contained within the BCT assessment.  
The (D to E) vector represents a BCT internalization flow associated with 
its members performing all functions and interactions related to the population. For 
instance, TF leaders hosting local tribal leaders to meetings and meals may now generate 
and communicate more tailored questions and concerns with respect to meeting local 
needs. Additionally, better practices can be implemented that address the principal 
concerns and confusions claimed to be endemic within Iraqi citizens. This knowledge 
flow is likely to be slow and require some trial and error as BCT leaders and members 
struggle to understand and learn what the Iraqi people truly perceive. 
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Finally, we return to knowledge flow vectors (A to B) and (A to B¹) and 
observe knowledge flow vectors (E to B) and (E to B¹). These vectors represent a 
feedback loop. Over time, as the HTT and BCT members engage local civilians, team 
and military members will provide feedback about their interactions and the effectiveness 
of projects. This information is shared through informal and formal socialization (tacit 
knowledge flow vector (A to B) and (E to B)), and through written formal assessments 
and after action reports (explicit knowledge flow vectors (A to B¹), (E to B¹)). This 
completes the knowledge flow loop and defines it as an iterative learning-doing process 
that continuously improves performance and increases overall knowledge stocks across 
the organization over time.  
b. IZ6 Contribution Toward ePRT/BCT Competitive Advantage 
This second narrative account yields two observations that indicate IZ6’s 
contribution toward improving the BCT’s competitive potential. First, IZ6 enables the 
BCT to better bridge into the population by first identifying the true perceptions of local 
citizens and leaders. Having this kind of knowledge allows for an improved quality of 
interaction between the BCT and the civilian population. This in turn helps the BCT 
refine all functions it performs with respect to the population (e.g., security, 
counterinsurgency, and reconstruction).  Improving social interaction and rapport with 
local leaders and civilians is crucial to establishing trust and eliminating misperception 
about America’s intent and practices. Thus, knowing popular perceptions is vital to 
accomplishing America’s objectives in Iraq. 
Second, the iterative process defined in Figure 5 demonstrates how 
knowledge accumulates over time. The feedback loop discussed in the figure provides 
new knowledge about popular perceptions as they become revealed through social 
interactions. Knowledge flow vectors (A to B), (A to B¹), (E to B), and (E to B¹) are in 
essence the avenues for lessons learned and thus indicate a process for increasing the 
BCT’s overall knowledge base over time. An accumulating knowledge stock over time 
improves organizational performance over time (Nissen, 2006, p. 81). This, in practice as 
well as theory, indicates a cumulatively improving competitive potential.  
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c. Potential Knowledge Flow Pathologies 
The feedback loop defined in Figure 5 enables the socialization and 
incorporation of new knowledge of the population as it becomes known. These are 
critical knowledge flow vectors that contribute toward growing the BCT’s overall 
knowledge stock and improving its competitive potential over time. Thus, if no process 
exists at the BCT to refine civil-military interactions based on feedback and knowledge 
of popular perceptions, then the feedback vectors in Figure 5 would be nullified. 
Therefore, a potential knowledge flow pathology could exist or emerge if the BCT does 
not emphasize applying new knowledge of popular perceptions obtained either from the 
HTT or BCT members working in the field.  
3. Internally Displaced Persons 
The third narrative account provided by IZ6 takes on a slightly different focus. 
Where the first two accounts improve social interactions between Americans and Iraqis, 
this account demonstrates how HTT and BCT efforts may help improve social 
interactions between Iraqis when intra-societal disputes emerge as a problem. More 
specifically, this third account details how IZ6 used open source knowledge to develop an 
arbitration program designed to mitigate property disputes arising from Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP). Property disputes are a common problem in Iraq that often lead 
to violence (Schaner, 2008d). 
IZ6 developed the arbitration program with the idea that it should become 
integrated into the Iraqi court system. Part of 2BCT/1AD’s responsibility for 
reconstruction is assisting the revitalization of an Iraqi court system and the rule of law. 
Thus, the BCT legal staff works directly with Iraqi officials to help develop a written 
legal code and infrastructure. At the time of this writing (September 2008), the HTT 
arbitration program is an approved BCT plan awaiting proposal to the Government of 
Iraq (GoI) in OE Striker (Schaner, 2008d). 
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All assistance provided to Iraqis in developing their judicial system requires a 
deep understanding and respect for traditional Islamic law, tribal law, tribal law in local 
practices, local culture, and traditions. IZ6 spent much effort researching traditional 
Islamic arbitration concepts from open sources to develop a plan that would be 
acceptable to the population and consistent within Islam and Iraqi traditional culture 
(Schaner, 2008d). 
a. Visual Knowledge Flow Analysis 
Evaluating this narrative account from a knowledge flow perspective, we 
recognize that explicit knowledge is clearly necessary for reestablishing the rule of law. 
In this case, we see research conducted on widely available resources (e.g., publications, 
books, articles) used to develop a detailed plan for resolving property disputes. Prior to 
addressing this potential problem, IZ6 members had little or no experience with Islamic 
arbitration. Therefore, this narrative demonstrates well how IZ6 leverages not only tacit 
knowledge, but also explicit knowledge to enhance important BCT initiatives. Figure 6 
traces the knowledge flow path from HTT research to the projected point of proposal 




Figure 6.   IDP Knowledge Flow Visualization Diagram. 
Examining Figure 6 more closely, we see that point A represents the HTT 
as it updates its tacit understanding of the local population by researching Islamic 
arbitration practices. Knowledge flow vector (A to B) represents an externalization flow 
as the HTT makes explicit its tacit understanding of what an arbitration program should 
look like within the context of OE Striker. This vector represents the development of a 
written product that outlines basic requirements for an arbitration plan. It is therefore best 
represented by flowing from the create to the formalize phase of the life cycle. 
Knowledge flow vector (B to C) represents the delivery and verbal 
briefing of the point paper to the BCT legal staff. This flow traces a path from the HTT  
formalize phase across the reach dimension to BCT staff at the share life cycle phase. At 
this point, the BCT legal staff reviews the proposal and discusses it with the HTT. 
Knowledge flow vector (C to D) represents the adoption of the HTT arbitration plan. This 
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is best represented by moving back to the formalize phase of the life cycle but at the BCT 
staff level of the reach dimension. At the time of this writing (September 2008), this is as 
far as the arbitration plan has gotten. It is currently an approved BCT proposal awaiting 
submission to Government of Iraq (GoI) officials in OE Striker. It is anticipated that a 
meeting will occur between the BCT legal staff, IZ6, and GoI legal officials in the near 
future. Thus the remainder of this knowledge flow analysis is based on the expectation 
that this meeting will occur and will result in incorporating some if not all of the 
arbitration plan into official Iraqi legal code. To represent expected future knowledge 
flows, vectors beyond point D are indicated with dashed lines. 
From point D, the plan is shared with the GoI during a meeting in which 
the proposal is briefed and discussed. Thus, knowledge flow vector (D to E) moves 
across the reach dimension to the GoI at the share dimension of the life cycle. From point 
E, the Government of Iraq incorporates the proposal into standing legal code to expand 
this body code to meet the need for arbitration. This action is represented by knowledge 
flow vector (E to F) moving along the explicit plane to the formalize phase of the life 
cycle. Finally, moving from point F to G we see the tacit application of this code by the 
Government of Iraq. Vector (F to G) moves to the apply phase of the life cycle in the tacit 
plane because arbitration requires adept application of the code in culturally complex and 
tense environments.  
b. IZ6 Contribution toward BCT Competitive Advantage 
This third narrative account yields two observations that indicate IZ6’s 
contribution toward improving the BCT’s competitive potential. First, IZ6 enables the 
BCT to bridge into the population by first contributing to the reestablishment of the rule 
of law. Developing the arbitration plan increase the amount of interaction occurring 
between BCT leaders, the HTT, and the civilian leaders. Moreover, this kind of 
interaction is positive because it helps create legal infrastructure necessary for 




essential services is identified in the Army and Marine Corps COIN manual as critical to 
winning the population’s support (U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, 2007, p. 169). 
The second contribution IZ6 makes in this narrative account is the 
proposed arbitration plan itself. The plan contributes to the BCT’s overall knowledge 
stock of the population by providing background knowledge of Islamic arbitration as it 
relates to the OE and IDPs. Additionally, the plan provides specific guidelines on how to 
deal with problems such as property disputes as they arise within the BCT’s OE. While 
this information is expected to be encoded within local laws, BCT members must be 
aware of these guidelines because they must work with the GoI and IDF to help maintain 
security and mitigate violence. Thus, the arbitration plan informs BCT members how to 
interact with the local population, government authorities, and security forces under 
specific circumstances.  
c. Potential Knowledge Flow Pathologies 
This scenario is characterized by IZ6 making an initial knowledge 
contribution by providing an arbitration plan for mitigating property disputes between 
Iraqi citizens. At the time of this writing (September 2008), the plan has been approved 
by the BCT staff and is awaiting proposal to the Government of Iraq. Should this product 
be adopted into the legal code, then it will have made a significant contribution. 
However, even if the plan is adopted, follow-up is required to ensure implementation is 
occurring when the need arises. Because 2BCT and the Government of Iraq work closely 
together on reconstruction efforts, and because 2BCT has a keen interest in minimizing 
civil violence, follow-up and follow-through is important. Laws are only good if they are 
enforced. Thus, potential knowledge flow pathology exists if the BCT does not follow up 
with the GoI after the plan is incorporated.  
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C. KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEMES 
This portion of the analysis draws three knowledge flow themes from the above 
narrative accounts and analysis. Taken together, the themes establish how IZ6 contributes 
to BCT competitive advantage and how it advances a population centric strategy. The 
three themes, identified as social bridging, growing the knowledge stock, and feedback 
and follow-up, are discussed in detail next.  
1. Theme #1: Social Bridging 
Perhaps the most important theme that emerges from the analysis is social 
bridging. The knowledge contributions observed in each of the narrative accounts all 
result in increasing opportunity for BCT – Civilian, or BCT – GoI interactions. In the 
first scenario, IZ6’s efforts enhanced the ability of the BCT to identify important 
reconstruction projects and to contract with local companies. Knowing what projects are 
important to the people requires knowing the people. The HTT in conjunction with CA 
teams immersed into the population to find out what Iraqis needed. With respect to 
contracting, IZ6 interviewed and observed local contractors to determine who the BCT 
should work with and hire. Both of these activities created opportunity for social 
interaction between the population and the BCT.  
In the second narrative account, IZ6 observed apparent contradictory attitudes 
from a local senior tribal Sheikh. This observation resulted in learning some aspects of 
Iraqi perceptions that were previously unknown. Knowledge of Iraqi civilian perceptions 
is crucial to knowing how to interact with them. In this case, knowledge of the tribal 
Sheikh’s true beliefs as expressed among his peers stands out as particularly useful to 
BCT staff and planners. In this scenario, the BCT leverages this new knowledge of 
popular perceptions to reshape its engagement practices with civilian leaders and the 




The third narrative account creates opportunity for improved social interactions 
by showing how the BCT can contribute to developing Iraqi legal code. By researching 
traditional Iraqi culture and Islamic arbitration practices, the BCT demonstrates to its 
Iraqi counterparts respect their culture. The proposal also generates opportunity for direct 
interaction and consultations between Iraqi legal professionals and American legal 




Figure 7.   HTT Social Bridging Diagram. 
Examining Figure 7 more closely, we see IZ6 symbolically positioned between 
Iraqi civilians, government officials, local leaders, and 2BCT. The networked figures 
within the diagram indicate various groups interacting with each other. Nodes indicated 
by circles represent key points of each network where relationships are established and 
knowledge flows. The left cluster represents the Iraqi civilian and governmental network 
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that exists within OE Striker. The center cluster represents 2BCT, and the right side 
cluster represents IZ6’s resource network located outside of OE Striker (e.g., open 
sources, the RRC, or the Subject Matter Expert Network).  
The black arrows indicate knowledge flows. Thick solid arrows indicate slower 
tacit knowledge flows cultivated through the development of relationships between the 
HTT and the BCT, and the HTT and Iraqis. Note that no thick solid arrows connect the 
BCT and Iraqis. Instead, thick dashed arrows connect the BCT and Iraqis. This is 
designed to show that these relationships are established after the HTT enables them. 
Because of rotational policies, new BCT’s arrive approximately once per year. Upon 
arrival, a BCT has no established contacts with the civilian population. All BCT relations 
with civilians are principally established by first going through the HTT who maintain 
relationships during transitional periods. The BCT-Population arrows are dashed to 
indicate that they are broken when the BCT rotates. Thin arrows indicate speedy explicit 
knowledge transfers such as the attainment of contextual reports from the RRC back in 
the United States.  
Figure 7 can be applied to any of the above narratives to visualize the social 
bridging process. For instance, in the first narrative the BCT leveraged open sources to 
obtain a basic contextual understanding of the OE’s ability to support agriculture. This is 
represented by the thin arrows stretching across from the right side network to the IZ6 
node. Then, the HTT immersed into the population to observe and interview them about 
developing agriculture in the area. Multiple iterations of interviews and observations 
established relationships between the team and local civilians. These relationships 
enabled knowledge to flow and build a tacit understanding of revitalization requirements. 
This is represented by the thick arrows connecting IZ6 and the population. Finally, the 
BCT begins to work with local civilian contractors to dig wells in support of 
infrastructure development. These social interactions occur in multiple places, with 




The basic sequence demonstrated above can be applied to many instances of HTT 
support to BCT operations. The idea of leveraging information resources to establish a 
baseline of knowledge about a requirement, followed by more in depth social science 
research within the population, followed by increased interaction between the BCT and 
the civilian population establishes a pattern of HTT knowledge contributions that 
enhances social bridging. 
2. Theme #2: Growing the Knowledge Stock 
The second important theme observed from the above analysis is growing the 
BCT knowledge stock over time. In all three narrative accounts we observe IZ6’s 
contribution to the BCT’s knowledge stock. Recognizing the problem of maintaining 
knowledge stocks and relationships during periods of BCT rotation, IZ6 is deployed in a 
manner consistent with HTS rotational policy designed to provide continuity. IZ6 will 
remain in place when 2BCT is scheduled to rotate. This rotational policy greatly 
enhances the ability of the incoming BCT to establish civilian relationships more quickly, 
and leverage a persistent knowledge stock. Figure 8 graphically depicts the effect the 




Figure 8.   Growing Persistent Knowledge Stocks. 
Observing the Figure 8 more closely, we see Knowledge of the Human Terrain on 
the vertical axis and Time on horizontal axis. The curved solid lines represent the level of 
knowledge possessed by the current outgoing and future incoming BCTs. The straight 
line indicates the level of knowledge possessed by the HTT over time. The dashed line 
indicates the cumulative level of knowledge possessed by BCTs over time. The HTT 
solid line is purposely positioned at a higher level of knowledge than the BCTs because 
the HTT is comprised of people especially trained to focus on and research the 
population. Moreover, they spend all of their time focusing on the population and finding 
ways the BCT can compel their support. Thus, the HTT is always likely to maintain a 
higher level of knowledge of the population than the BCT. 
Note that because of the HTT’s persistent presence, the incoming BCT arrives 
with a higher knowledge stock starting position than the previous BCT. This higher 
knowledge stock position is possible because the HTT remains in place, accumulates 
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knowledge over time, and makes its explicit product available to the incoming BCT prior 
to its arrival. Moreover, as the BCT arrives, it quickly assimilates the existent HTT into it 
structure to facilitate internal knowledge flows. 
Starting at the highest possible knowledge stock position is important because of 
the dynamic effect of knowledge and performance as asserted by Knowledge Flow 
Theory (Nissen, 2006, p. 80). Figure 9 illustrates this phenomenon by showing how the 
rate of improved performance increases with growing knowledge stocks. This figure and 
concept within Knowledge Flow Theory explains and illustrates how an HTT improves a 
BCT’s competitive potential over time. 
 
Figure 9.   Improving Performance by Growing Knowledge Stocks. 
Examining Figure 9 more closely, we see that a pattern exists such that as 
knowledge stocks increase across an organization, so does the organization’s 
performance. Moreover, the rate of performance improvement increases as knowledge 
stocks increase. Knowledge Flow Theory asserts that knowledge stocks, flow time, and 
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performance are all related in such a way that as an organization acquires more 
knowledge, the faster it can learn and acquire new knowledge (Nissen, 2006, p. 81). 
Moreover, the theory asserts that knowledge enables action (Nissen, 2006). Putting these 
two concepts together gives rise to the above figure such that over time an organization’s 
performance will improve at an increasing rate with increasing knowledge stocks. The 
linchpin in the context of BCTs performing various functions in Iraq is knowledge and 
relationships loss during turnover. The HTT concept is designed precisely to mitigate this 
problem with its rotation policy.  
3. Theme #3: Feedback and Follow-Up 
The third and final important theme observed from the analysis is the importance 
of feedback and follow-up. A common potential pathology identified in all three 
narratives is closing the feedback loop. This is essential to organizational learning, 
growing the knowledge stock, and improving performance over time. The pathology of 
no feedback or follow-up could result from changing priorities associated with new units 
as they arrive. For instance, if 2BCT places a premium on developing a culturally 
acceptable and codified arbitration program, its replacement BCT may not. This situation 
would present a very inconsistent picture to Iraqi citizens and leaders and would inhibit 
the cumulative growth of a persistent knowledge stock.  
Therefore, the HTT appears to be in a unique position of responsibility. Not only 
must the HTT facilitate the forging of new relationships between BCT members and the 
population each time a new BCT arrives, but it must also ensure operational continuity 
between BCTs in order to guarantee knowledge continuity, growth, and persistence. This 
is essential to ensuring that feedback is obtained and incorporated into organizational 
learning processes designed to enhance performance. 
D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
This chapter applies the analytical method described in Chapter III to examine the 
focal HTT (IZ6) holistically. More specifically, the research applies Knowledge Flow 
Theory to reveal how the focal organization creates, shares, and harnesses knowledge of 
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the population to enhance the competitive potential of the host Brigade. The analysis is 
repeated three times to examine IZ6 in three different scenarios. Narratives provided by 
IZ6 serve as the basis for constructing knowledge flow diagrams and the setting for 
analysis.  
The research reveals several themes useful for deriving conclusions and 
recommendations. First, the research identifies improved social bridging as a principal 
contribution made by IZ6. Increasing the opportunity for U.S. and Iraqi interaction is 
vital to increasing cooperation and eliminating sources of mistrust. Moreover, social 
interaction provides opportunity for growing BCT and Iraqi knowledge stocks of 
eachother. This leads to the second emergent theme – growing the knowledge stock – as 
another vital IZ6 contribution. The research shows how growing the knowledge stock 
improves the BCT’s competitive potential. Finally, the research identifies feedback and 
follow-up as a third important theme and related theme. Without this, social interactions 
break down and valuable knowledge is lost unnecessarily. The final chapter discusses 
these themes as they lead to conclusions and recommendations.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations based on the analytical 
results of Chapter IV and contextual information contained within the thesis. The themes 
drawn in Chapter IV are considered here to infer answers to the research questions 
identified in Chapter I and to provide additional insights. This chapter begins with 
conclusive remarks of how the embedded HTT improves civil-military social interactions 
and grows persistent knowledge stocks of the population. Next, conclusive remarks are 
drawn pertaining to potential knowledge flow pathologies as they relate specifically to 
Chapter IV results and generally to opposition movements described in Chapter II. 
Finally, the chapter provides specific recommendations that may be used to inform future 
HTS design and implementation.     
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The themes drawn from the analysis demonstrate that the embedded Human 
Terrain Team (HTT) concept is valid and necessary in the context of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) and nation building. The research indicates that embedded HTTs, such as IZ6, 
enhance the competitive potential of the supported unit (e.g., Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT)) by creating, sharing, and harnessing knowledge of the population. Moreover, 
embedded HTTs by their very nature and purpose compel the supported unit to pursue 
more effectively a population-centric strategy. Both of these achievements (creating 
competitive advantage, and advancing a population-centric strategy) are made possible 
by embedded HTTs as they enable improved social interactions between U.S. military 
personnel and local civilians, and as they grow persistent knowledge stocks of the 
population. However, these achievements are potentially ephemeral if feedback about 
unit initiatives is not solicited from the population, if changing mission requirements 
inhibit feedback or follow-through of current or prior unit initiatives, or if opposition 




1. HTTs Improve BCT Competitive Potential 
The analysis shows that embedded HTTs grow BCT knowledge stocks of the 
population. As the HTT fulfills research requirements in support of non-kinetic unit 
mission objectives, the resultant knowledge is shared with and leveraged by the BCT. 
Knowledge Flow Theory asserts that growing organizational knowledge stocks over time 
increases organizational performance (Nissen, 2006, p. 80). Not only do embedded HTTs 
fill BCT knowledge gaps of the human terrain, but their staggered rotational policy also 
ensures knowledge continuity during periods of unit turnover. This is a unique policy 
characteristic that directly enhances knowledge accumulation and institutional memory.  
Moreover, the embedded Human Terrain Team concept causes team members to 
establish personal contacts and relationships with local citizens and leaders. This creates 
an environment that emphasizes the accumulation of population-centric tacit knowledge 
over time. Knowledge Flow Theory asserts that tacit knowledge is a kind of unique 
experiential knowledge that is slow to develop but is particularly powerful (Nissen, 
2006). Its power is derived from an uneven distribution and its situated local context. 
Such knowledge accumulates individually or organizationally through social interactions 
and relationships. The more social interactions occur between HTT members or U.S. 
military personnel and the local population, the more likely it is that tacit knowledge will 
accumulate – thus raising the BCT’s competitive potential.  
Furthermore, tacit knowledge is strongly linked to knowing the population by 
understanding its perceptions, culture, and beliefs. Institution Theory and McCormick’s 
theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency highlight the importance of knowing the 
population’s perceptions and beliefs because these are what most strongly influence 
behavior and attitudes. Thus, by focusing its research on the population, the embedded 
HTT is uniquely positioned to grow tacit knowledge of the population that helps the BCT 
better understand the root of the population’s behavior. This is the most crucial kind of 
knowledge a counterinsurgent can have if it hopes to compel popular support. 
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2. HTTs Advance a Population-Centric Strategy 
The second conclusion is related to the first such that it relates to improved social 
interactions. In the first conclusion we assert that social interactions improve the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge of the population. In the second conclusion we assert 
that increasing knowledge stocks and improving social interactions between U.S. 
personnel (HTT or BCT) and local civilians advances a population-centric strategy. This 
occurs as HTTs arm the BCT with knowledge of the population and provide it with 
opportunity to interact with the population. Thus, the embedded HTT concept enables the 
BCT to more effectively pursue the population and compel its support. 
Such a focus equates to McCormick’s first strategy of counterinsurgency. Recall 
the Mystic Diamond Model in Chapter II as it describes the proper sequence of strategies 
that ought to be pursued by a counterinsurgent. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps manual 
on counterinsurgency asserts that “…military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies 
are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional 
war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge” 
(U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p. lii). This quote 
highlights well exactly the niche the embedded HTT concept fills. By providing the BCT 
with knowledge of the population, it compels the BCT to focus on it, and thus provides 
opportunity not to wage conventional war against insurgents. Thus, the HTT advances a 
population-centric strategy. 
3. Feedback and Follow-Through are Essential 
The third conclusion is related to the first two such that it identifies feedback and 
follow-through as essential enablers to growing the knowledge stock and improving 
social interactions. This conclusion does not imply that feedback and follow-through is 
not occurring, but rather serves a cautionary point for future consideration. To grow BCT 
knowledge stocks and refine BCT performance the research shows that feedback from the 
population provides a crucial knowledge input. Moreover, actively seeking feedback 
from local citizens and leaders about BCT initiatives delivers a signal of sincerity and can 
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help erase misperceptions. Thus, soliciting feedback is directly tied to Institution Theory 
and McCormick’s theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency by linking feedback 
knowledge to understanding popular perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.  
Moreover, follow-through on BCT non-kinetic initiatives is equally essential. 
Whether follow-through comes from a single unit on a short duration project or a series 
of units over a long term project, it is essential to shaping positive perceptions of the 
people. Additionally, follow-through increases the opportunity for positive and persistent 
social interactions between military or HTT members and the civilian population. Thus, it 
too facilitates the growth of BCT knowledge stocks, improves social interactions, and 
advances a population-centric strategy.  
4. Opposition to HTS May Limit Long-Term Efficacy 
Chapter II introduces two sources of opposition to the HTS project. The first form 
of opposition comes from the social sciences community. Organizations like the Network 
of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) are strongly opposed to the notion of 
anthropologists supporting counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, more benign 
opposition exists from government planners, military thinkers, and analysts. Much of this 
opposition stems from a belief that available resources could be better used and that new 
projects like the HTS are largely unnecessary or insufficient.  
These two forms of opposition could inhibit the long term efficacy of the HTS 
project. As the project grows, as demand for HTS products and services increase, and as 
the concept is expanded to work in accessible areas prior to conflict, the need for having 
a reliable source pool of highly trained social scientists will expand. Given the level of 
opposition from the anthropological community, it may be necessary in the future to 
develop an alternative source pool of candidate participants.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final section of this thesis provides specific actions that could be taken to 
mitigate the potential pathologies identified in conclusions 3 and 4. The foremost and 
potentially most enduring problem that should be addressed is the active opposition 
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exhibited by the professional anthropological community. The second most important 
potential pathology that could emerge and should be addressed to prevent its emergence 
is ensuring feedback and follow-through with civilians and projects in the host nation. 
The remainder of this section provides specific recommendations for addressing the 
above potential pathologies. 
1. Create Professional Military Social Scientists 
Developing professional military social scientists with the requisite skills 
necessary to perform the roles identified throughout the HTS organization may be 
necessary to ensure an adequate future pool of high quality candidate participants. This 
recommendation suggests the designation of a new military professional who is educated 
and trained to become an expert in a pre-designated area of interest (e.g., a specific 
country, region, or tribe), and who becomes an expert in social science research; the 
focus language, history, and culture; counterinsurgency; nation building; peace and 
security operations; and strategy and policy.  
Institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Defense Language 
Institute (DLI) are perfectly situated to develop a professional military social scientist 
because they already provide much of the kind education required above. Moreover, the 
programs at these schools could be quickly adapted to provide any additional educational 
requirements identified if such a professional degree program were designed. 
Developing a sufficient pool of professional military social scientists will reduce 
the demand for recruiting civilian social scientists from professional academic circles. 
Moreover, developing a professional military social scientist comes with the added 
benefit that he or she is already steeped in the military culture, knows its capabilities, and 
understands how its resources can be used in the conflict prevention and COIN contexts. 
Furthermore, drawing from a large pool of military professional social scientists may 
reduce opposition from the anthropological community provided this hypothetical 
professional is not credentialed and labeled as a professional anthropologist.  
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2. Integrate a Knowledge Management Program into the HTS 
Framework 
The HTS organization and way of operation implicitly adopts many of the 
concepts found within Knowledge Flow Theory. For instance, the HTS places a premium 
on creating and sharing relevant cultural knowledge and enabling social interactions 
between U.S. personnel and local civilians. Implied within these actions is recognition of 
the value of knowledge and of social bonds as knowledge flow enablers. Additionally, 
HTT rotational policies are designed specifically to mitigate significant knowledge loss 
during periods of turnover. This implies recognition that accumulating knowledge stocks 
improve performance over time.  
The reality is that the HTS is a knowledge based organization designed to create, 
share, manage, and harness knowledge for the express purpose of enhancing competitive 
potential and improving supported unit performance in challenging and complex 
environments. Thus, it may be appropriate for the HTS to integrate further and make 
explicit within its framework more concepts related to Knowledge Flow Theory. 
Explicitly integrating concepts from Knowledge Flow Theory into the HTS framework 
can ensure certain knowledge flow related pathologies never emerge – such as a lack of 
feedback and follow-through with local civilians. Under the current framework, such a 
pathology could emerge. While the likelihood of its emergence in part depends upon the 
character and priorities of the BCT, another cause could simply be not having a 
knowledge management mechanism and policy in place.  
The HTS could benefit from future research that focuses on developing a 
knowledge management mechanism and policy. Students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School could offer such research. 
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